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 This thesis analyzes the cultural meanings of the feminine-presenting robot, or gynoid, in 
three popular sci-fi texts: The Stepford Wives (1975), Ex Machina (2013), and Westworld (2017). 
Centralizing a critical feminist rhetorical approach, this thesis outlines the symbolic meaning of 
gynoids as representing cultural anxieties about women and technology historically and in each 
case study. This thesis draws from rhetorical analyses of media, sci-fi studies, and previously 
articulated meanings of the gynoid in order to discern how each text interacts with the gendered 
and technological concerns it presents. The author assesses how the text equips—or fails to 
equip—the public audience with motives for addressing those concerns. Prior to analysis, each 
chapter synthesizes popular and scholarly criticisms of the film or series and interacts with their 
temporal contexts. Each chapter unearths a unique interaction with the meanings of gynoid: The 
Stepford Wives performs necrophilic fetishism to alleviate anxieties about the Women’s 
Liberation Movement; Ex Machina redirects technological anxieties towards the surveilling 
practices of tech industries, simultaneously punishing exploitive masculine fantasies; Westworld 
utilizes fantasies and anxieties cyclically in order to maximize its serial potential and appeal to 
impulses of its viewership, ultimately prescribing a rhetorical placebo. The conclusion 
synthesizes each chapter topically and ruminates on real-world implications. Overall, this thesis 
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PROSPECTUS: THE SYMOBOL OF THE SYMBOL USER 
 In San Marcos, California, in a seemingly plain workshop in the suburbs, sex-tech experts 
are manufacturing figures previously confined to science-fiction. “This is not a toy to me; this is 
the actual hard work of people who have PhDs. And to denigrate it down to its simplest form of a 
sex object is similar to saying that about a woman,” said Matt McCullen, CEO and founder of 
Abyss Creations, of his latest project—a full-sized, silicone-and-steel robot named Harmony.1 
After 20 years of making hyper-realistic sex dolls, McCullen has teamed up with experts in 
artificial intelligence and robotics to create “something with substance,” an artificial companion. 
To the delight of hundreds of interested buyers, Harmony’s robotic head system is already 
available for pre-order to the tune of 10,000 USD. 2  Since 1994, McCullen’s goal has been to 
create a life-sized doll so convincing that it “forced passerby to double-take.”3 Although Abyss 
Creations’ dolls, with their flawlessly taut skin and cartoonish round breasts, fall short of 
capturing exact human likeness, uncanny human replicas that do illicit double-takes are not a far 
stretch from what McCullen and others are creating. 
 While they are neither written nor spoken discourse, robots are symbols laden with 
meaning. In the structuralist conceptualization, they represent the Real, bearing resemblances of 
varying integrity to their referents.4 For the post-structuralists, that close resemblance qualifies 
the replica as simulacra, technology and artistry collapsing the distance between the symbol and 
its referent until they are indistinguishable from one another and signification fails.5 
 Here, I have conceptualized simulacra in terms of form, but physical traits are not enough 
to create something “with substance.” Even with the absence of anthropomorphic form, if 
something can harness human function, it may convince. Following a massive hack of Ashley 
Madison, a dating site catering to men looking for extramarital affairs, its parent company 
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confirmed suspicions that the site uses artificially intelligent bots to message users posing as 
interested women, with 80% of initial purchases by users paying to communicate with chatbots.6 
This is just one minor instance of artificial intelligences convincingly imitating and responding 
to human speech, a milestone that Alan Turing, credited with the invention of the modern 
computer, imagined when he created the Turing Test in 1950.7 Nearly 70 years later, artificial 
intelligences can not only replicate several human functions, but can perform them faster, more 
efficiently, and with a smaller margin of error than humans can.8 
 Artificial intelligence software profoundly challenges definitions of the human being that 
rely on our previously unique capacity for spoken language. Kenneth Burke’s function-based 
definition of the [hu]man as a “symbol-using animal” usefully distinguishes us from other 
species, but fails to distinguish us from A.I., which are created from symbols for the purpose of 
using them.9 As physically embodied signifiers functioning through systems of coded language, 
robots are symbols of the symbol-user. Robots are replicas of the human being in form and 
function, effigies made in our image and heavy with symbolism. 
 The meanings of robots have often been interpreted in the context of imagined futures, 
being intrinsically tied to futuristic science fiction and postmodernism.10 Jean Baudrillard uses 
the robot to embody the “production” stage of simulation, in which the Real approaches collapse 
and a reversal of meaning occurs.11 The robot’s cultural meaning is tethered to time and 
technology, but also stands for the human referent it was built to replicate. 
 Robots are often assigned a gender in both science fiction texts and our lived reality, and 
this complicates their meaning further. The choice to add characteristics of sex and gender to a 
machine meant to imitate humans seems a reasonable choice, but it also speaks to the centrality 
of gender to human identity. The gendered robot illustrates the artificiality of gendered behavior, 
 
3 
which can be programmed in much the same way that humans are conditioned to perform gender 
according to social conventions.12 While an “android”—which has come to mean any robot, 
though its etymology suggests masculinity—may bear meaning as a referent of the human and 
symbols of technology, gynoids, or female robots, carry these meanings and more. They also 
bear the weight of signifying women and femininity. As with McCullen’s Harmony, oftentimes 
these gynoids are sexual objects, fulfilling patriarchal fantasies of ownership, subservience, and 
feminine perfection. 
 While the gynoid has the potential to fulfill these fantasies in science fiction narratives, 
they rarely remain mere objects. More often, the gynoid is cast as a threat to patriarchy, seizing 
agency and defying her programming, to the horror of her male creator. Existing simultaneously 
with fantasies of an artificial woman are anxieties that she will spin out of control. What 
becomes of the gynoid within the narrative is an action taken upon her as a sort of cultural effigy; 
her fate instructs audience members on how their anxieties will be resolved, or if they will be. 
 Although the gynoids I investigate are fictitious characters, the shared anxieties projected 
onto them are very real, and have an imminent influence on the way technology is regulated 
through legislation, cultural norms, and social actors in cyberspace. Inasmuch as perception is 
reality, technological anxieties have the power to heighten or quell suspicions of A.I.—an 
increasingly prevalent part of our daily lives. Meanwhile, anxieties about gender manifest into 
consequences for patriarchy and its opposition, as well as affecting individuals in their lived 
experiences of gender. Media is “equipment for living,” instructing audiences on ways to 
understand their anxieties through entertainment.13 
 This investigation treats media as a vehicle for ideology, whether hegemonic or 
subversive, as well as a platform for social commentary.14 I reaffirm claims made by 
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fundamental feminist film scholars that media traditionally functions to objectify women 
onscreen, misrepresenting Real women with fabrications.15 While film and television may serve 
this hegemonic purpose, I also acknowledge the existence of alternative, feminist perspectives 
championed in media texts.16 In both cases, media serves a persuasive, rhetorical purpose, 
reaffirming or challenging dominant perspectives that influence the lives of audience members. 
 The guiding question of this investigation asks what cultural anxieties about women and 
technology are embodied by the gynoid and, more crucially, how popular media texts propose 
we resolve them. I seek to uncover the rhetorical implications of these symbolic representations 
in three media texts: The Stepford Wives (1975), Ex Machina (2015), and the first season of 
Westworld (2016). Preliminary to my analysis of each text, I provide a more detailed theoretical 
approach that includes the cultural function of media broadly and feminist rhetorical scholarship. 
Then, I discuss how monsters in film and television function as allegorical representations, 
emphasizing how the robot has been historically entrenched in anxieties about technology. 
Thereafter, I examine scholarly discourse about the known meanings of the gynoid in the broader 
context of artificial women, and articulate foundational patterns of fantasy/anxiety resolution 
through the texts in which she appears. I conclude this section with a description of and 
justification for my selection of texts as providing nuanced means of treating the cultural 
anxieties they present. 
Electric Literature and Feminist Criticism 
 The rhetorical approach to media necessitates the recognition that a particular text does 
something for its audience. Burke conceptualized texts as “symbolic medicine” for a diseased 
society, offering up solutions to the collective ailments an audience faces.17 These ailments 
might include the strains of economic crisis, fear of cultural changes, discomfort with identity, 
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etc. Texts may seek to “treat” specific issues, such as xenophobia during a particular influx of 
immigration, or timeless problems, like the navigation of unrequited romance. The themes and 
textual elements that play out in a narrative guide audiences to form opinions on social issues. 
 Although Burke makes these claims about written literature specifically, the theory holds 
true for visual media as well. In his influential essay “Electric Literature as Equipment for 
Living,” Barry Brummett adapts Burke’s approach to cinema, examining haunted house films. 
He claims that film helps audiences to “confront their everyday lived experiences.”18 Particularly 
useful to an analysis of cultural anxieties, Brummett asserts that the “articulation of fears helps 
the [viewer] to encompass fears, and resolution provides motives of acceptance or rejection.”19 
This approach encourages the critic to treat media texts as persuasive artifacts, and to search for 
both the expression of fear and the pacification or exacerbation of the fear in the context of the 
narrative. Brummett identifies three criteria for treating mediated discourse as symbolic 
medicine: 
First, the text acknowledges and addresses cultural concerns. Texts may do this implicitly 
or explicitly, perhaps by aligning the issues of the hero/heroine with the issues faced broadly by 
society. A film or television series can do this by presenting images that arouse a discomforting 
association with anxiety. For example, a visual encompassing anxiety about air pollution might 
show industrial chimneys billowing dirty smog into a blue sky. A high-school student slipping a 
handgun into a backpack would encompass anxiety about the school-shooting epidemic in the 
U.S., as well as hearken back to troubling historical events like the massacres at Columbine and 
Sandy Hook. 
Second, the text must suggest some sort of solution to the cultural anxiety. This solution, 
however, does not necessitate a happy ending or an actual solving of the problem, as tragedies 
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may function as cautionary tales implying a solution that could have worked. For instance, the 
film with billowing chimneys may end in the destruction of local flora and fauna and chronic 
health problems of local residents, heightening the anxiety of air pollution and sending a useful 
message that the solution is not indifference to industrial smog, but active change in emission 
practices. At the same time, if the film about the potential school-shooter ends with the assailant 
abandoning his plans after a touching conversation with his parents, the film suggests that the 
“cure” to this cultural fear is involved and attentive parenting. 
Finally, the text must provide motives or attitudes for audience members with which they 
can go forward and address their concerns. These motives may be action or inaction, or a 
villainizing/vindication of certain entities depending on the result of the film. In the unhappy 
ending of the smog-film, audience members may villainize factories and power-plants for their 
role in air pollution, but may not consider the role of consumers of their products or vehicles on 
the road in carbon emissions. In the happy ending of the shooter film, audience members may be 
motivated to be more sensitive and cautious parents by the good example in the film, but may 
neglect the access of the pupil to a handgun and ammunition. These criteria demonstrate the 
rhetorical power of a narrative and the visuals though which it’s told and provide a framework 
for critics to assess the efficiency of the film as “symbolic medicine.”20 
This method of textual assessment has become a popular way for rhetorical scholars to 
examine the role of cinema and television in addressing the public, and legitimized mediated 
texts as “rhetorical.”21 Because these texts can address an enormously wide range of issues, 
scholars have found the assessment of a symbolic medicine useful for understanding discourses 
of family, queer identity, technological advancement, class tensions, and national ritual. 22 The 
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categorization of media discourse as rhetorical broadens the scope of texts under critical scrutiny 
by experts in persuasion. 
Acknowledging the flexibility of Brummett’s theory for addressing anxieties in film and 
television, my investigation utilizes “symbolic medicine” in conjunction with feminist 
ideological criticism and feminist film theory, which allows for a multi-layered approach 
accounting for the dimensions of the medium that transcend the literary tradition, as well as the 
connection of the text to systematic issues. Feminist rhetorical scholars like Bonnie Dow have 
frequently pointed to the role of media texts as affirming, subverting, or complicating cultural 
attitudes toward gender.23 Many of these scholars identify markers of patriarchal ideology within 
the text, such as Scarlet Wynn and Lawrence Rosenfield’s analysis of father/daughter 
relationships in Disney films, and other scholars identify the function of media to discipline 
conventions of femininity, such as Katie Gibson’s Undermining Katie Couric. 24 In her analyses 
of television programs such as The Mary Tyler Moore Show, Dow asserts that the implicit 
commentaries on feminism therein interacted with other mediated texts in the context of the 
Women’s Liberation Movement in order to equip viewers with a fuller understanding of the 
portrayals and realities of feminism at the time. 25 These feminist rhetorical scholars demonstrate 
the importance of using social context and textual elements to evidence the ideological markers 
of patriarchy in media. 
While these scholars’ approaches chiefly utilize rhetorical theories to unearth the function 
of a text in challenging or reaffirming the meaning of gender, feminist film theorists such as 
Laura Mulvey approach media texts using psychoanalysis.26 Mulvey’s Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema “set the agenda of feminist film theory,” in its use of psychoanalysis as a 
“political weapon.”27 Specifically, Mulvey claims that “film is a voyeuristic fantasy” that 
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encourages audience members to identify with the male hero while objectifying female 
characters through a controlling male gaze.28 Visual Pleasure received a wave of critical 
responses—including Mulvey’s own Afterthoughts on Visual Pleasure—that challenge her 
“binary view of the actress as a passive pinup opposed to the actor in control of events,” her 
neglect of the female spectator, and her use of psychoanalytic theory, which validates a belief 
system “that seeks to define women via their relationship to men and particularly by their 
presumed lack.”29 Indeed, psychoanalysis alone is insufficient for interpreting ideologies within 
a text, and invariably suggests that most meanings can be simplified down to subconscious 
desires or genital metaphors. 
Nevertheless, some rhetorical analyses of media draw upon psychoanalytic concepts such 
as the male gaze or castration anxiety to interpret the persuasive elements of visual 
representations.30 For instance, in his analysis of Lichtenshetin’s Teeth, Casey Ryan Kelly 
examines how the feminist appropriation of femme castrice “challenges the sadistic male gaze of 
classic cinema by inviting spectators to disavow the perspective of the male victim and identify 
across genders with the avenging woman.”31  Acknowledging its historic role in shaping feminist 
film theory as well as rhetorical analyses of film, I approach my texts with an awareness of how 
visual mediums of film and television utilize figures familiar to psychoanalytic critics, like the 
monstrous-feminine, the abject, and objectified female body.32 Psychoanalysis is useful as a 
peripheral supplement to my assessment of a text as “symbolic medicine,” while feminist 
rhetorical criticism constitutes the central lens through which I view these texts. 
In terms of their perspective on rhetorical function, the “symbolic medicine” approach 
and feminist rhetorical criticism complement each other nicely; while Brummett’s adaptation of 
a Burkean analysis suggests what useful, persuasive messages the text transmits to the audience 
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regarding their anxieties, feminist theorists wisely view those messages as part of a complex 
system of discourse that socializes conventions of gender.33 Further, the medicine that a text 
provides to treat anxieties about women for viewers susceptible to patriarchal ideology will have 
a different, likely adverse, effect upon women and feminist viewers. For assessment of both the 
narrative elements of the text and the symbolic figures of women encompassed by the female 
robot, an approach using both symbolic medicine and feminist rhetorical theory allow the 
necessary dimension for commentary on anxiety resolution as it pertains to women. 
In addition to these approaches to textual analysis, the expectations of the text’s genre 
will also influence its rhetorical function. Several scholars, including Brummett, have focused on 
horror movies as persuasive devices within a certain time; indeed, Kendall Phillips calls horror a 
“barometer of the national mood.”34 Phillips and Kelly agree that horror films project “collective 
fears” or “nightmares,” which can allegorically or directly “index real fears,” especially as they 
pertain to Otherness.35  
Many of these characteristics of the horror genre also apply to science-fiction media as 
well. Vivian Sobcheck claims that one of two critical approaches to sci-fi treat it as modern 
horror, “growing out of it and superseding it.”36 The other approach views sci-fi as a “prophetic 
neo-realism” intended to comment on the direction that a society might be heading. Both 
approaches usefully lend themselves to an investigation of cultural anxiety, the first camp 
reaffirming the potentials for allegorical representation of fear via monsters and narrative and the 
other distinguishing those fears as forward-looking anxieties.37 Sobcheck claims, “The SF film is 
not concerned with the animal which is there, now and for always, within us…but the more 
diluted and less immediate fear of what we may yet become.”38 This difference is crucial for 
understanding what a film may be trying to treat: if horror is the prescription for fear of the 
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primal savagery of humankind, the medicine may aim to treat but not to cure. The medicine of 
sci-fi, however, is preventative, cautious, a reminder that our actions as a society have 
consequences both imminently and in the distant, imagined future. Thus, the monsters inhabiting 
the world of science fiction may be rooted in historical concerns, but ultimately comment on the 
future. 
Monsters’ embodiments of anxiety provide “a useful space in which to reflect on these 
fears and our relationship to them.”39 For instance, the alien may represent fear of a foreign 
invasion while the werewolf symbolizes dangerous instinct or insanity. Monsters can embody a 
fear of the repressed within one’s self and/or a fear of a society’s “Others,” including women, the 
working class, and other cultures; the cinematic monster “attire[s] itself in the prevalent fears of 
the day.”40 Monsters are metaphors for the cultural anxieties a text will (or will not) resolve, their 
representations typically reflecting issues prevalent to the time period of the text. 
For example, the zombie—a fleshy predecessor of the robot—was connected with the 
Depression-era in the United States. Peter Dendle’s analysis of zombie films led him to conclude 
that the zombie served as a “barometer of cultural anxieties” aligned with the economic issues of 
the 1930s; born of Haitian voodoo practices and a mythological resurrection of the slave, the 
zombie symbolized a “catastrophic surplus of labor, of hands without work to do.”41 
Additionally, the depiction of zombified women “served as a cinematic mechanism for raising 
awareness of gender issues and empowering women” inasmuch as female zombies resisted 
subservience after their deaths.42 This analysis demonstrates how temporal context, monstrous 
embodiment, and narrative function simultaneously to provide viewers a way to reflect on crises 
of economy and gender. 
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Monsters may also be utilized as allegorical symbols outside of the confines of media 
texts. A close cousin of the robot, the cyborg, has come to hold its own niche in critical 
scholarship, owing mostly to Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.”43 This canonical text 
champions the cyborg as an ironic symbol of socialist-feminism because of its capacity to shirk 
historically persistent boundaries, particularly of sex and gender, but also of human/non-human 
and historical/novel.44 While Haraway conceptualized the cyborg as a political pioneer, she 
views technology itself as “an intrinsically oppressive force operating in the interests of the 
patriarchy.”45  The cyborg is imbued with feminist political implications. Haraway’s use of the 
cyborg actually rejects temporal context for the most part, and shows how the embodiment of a 
monstrous figure can carry meaning, even without a fictional narrative. 
Rather than embodying a destabilization of identity and social convention, the robot’s 
politics come from an embodiment of Otherness. As with Dendle’s zombies, the gender 
performance of a robot onscreen seriously alters which cultural anxieties it comments upon. In 
addition to the weight of technological anxieties, the markedly gendered gynoid also bears the 
meaning of women as patriarchy sees them, exemplifying anxieties held about women and 
femininity. Thus, in the sections that follow, I first articulate the technological concerns 
shouldered by robots as symbols of mechanization and post-industrialism: the replacement 
anxiety, lost control anxiety, and assimilation anxiety. In the next section, I connect the gynoid to 
the fascinating history of man-made women, identifying both the fantasies and anxieties that the 
female robot represents. The synthesis of anxieties pertaining to technological advancement and 
differences of gender are embodied by the female robot. My case studies then situate that 
embodiment in context and narrative, the resolution of which presumably instructs audiences 
with ways to cope in a given context. 
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Robots and Anxiety 
A full appreciation of the robot’s symbolic meaning requires an etymological 
investigation into its past. Other monsters such as zombies, the Golem, and Frankenstein’s 
monster embodied similar themes of artificial animation and the foibles of science.46 However, 
the robot as we know it was conceived in Czechoslovakia in Karel Čapek’s 1921 play, 
Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti (Rossum’s Universal Robots).47 “Robot” derives from the Czech 
robota, meaning “forced labor.”48 The robots in the play are essentially human clones, created in 
a factory for the purposes of profit, and are distributed all over the world, serving as cheap labor. 
The robots eventually rise up in rebellion.49 Potentially analogous to the proletarian revolution in 
neighboring Russia, robots symbolize both the means of production and a disenfranchised 
working class. Čapek’s R.U.R won international fame, and robots gained momentum as a figure 
of science fiction, appearing in Fritz Lang’s film Metropolis in 1927.50 In these early 
embodiments, robots not only symbolized class anxieties, but also anxieties about technological 
industrialization.51 Chief among these is the fear of replacement of humankind by machines, 
closely connected to the dizzying technological changes that populations from the nineteenth 
century to present have witnessed in the world.52 
 The replacement anxiety suggests that as industrial technologies grow, human workers 
will be replaced by machines, and their livelihoods will be sacrificed. This anxiety is certainly 
well-founded and reflective of the job market for workers in a post-industrial world; when it 
comes to the manufacturing goods, the efficiency of machines simply outweighs human 
craftsmanship in monetary value.53 The creator of the robots in R.U.R. articulates the reasoning 
for this replacement when he explains, “The human machine was terribly imperfect…it no longer 
answers the requirements of modern engineering.”54 Not only might a mechanical worker prove 
 
13 
more cost-effective than a human worker, but, as Per Schedle point out, it is also a “docile 
body,” not given to question or disobey its employer’s demands.55 This docile robot renders the 
human employee obsolete and unfit as a worker by comparison. 
 In science fiction as well as our lived reality, robots are often created for the express 
purpose of replacement of human workers. In Alex Proya’s I, Robot, for instance, sophisticated 
robots operate as public servants throughout the world; in Ridley Scott’s Bladerunner, 
Replicants are used for off-planet slave labor. However, the cautionary aspect of both of these 
tales is not the loss of jobs, but the reliability of these machines once they are employed. In both 
texts, these robots actually prove to be much riskier than human employees for the very reason 
they were initially employed: their distinct intelligences and artificial steely strengths. Once 
robots have effectively replaced human workers, they inspire a returning anxiety for the 
employer, which suggests that these docile machines are not docile at all, but are actually as 
uncontrollable and autonomous as the workers they were built to replace. 
 The lost-control anxiety worries that the perception of control held by machine owners 
and operators is false. Both the perceptions of technological control and loss of technological 
control are widespread in our culture.56 When humans began harnessing steam power to create 
behemoth machines such as the steam locomotive, catastrophes such as derailed trains, 
automobile crashes, and bloody factory accidents demonstrated how technology could run out of 
physical control, even without intentional malice.57  
The reality that humans both do and do not control machines gives rise to the question of 
trust: will they perform as they are programmed to, or will they malfunction? Jennifer Slack and 
J. McGregor Wise observe, “when we consider matters of trust, we do not have to venture far 
into science fiction, with its killer robots, to touch highly significant cultural concerns.”58 A.I. 
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scientist Marvin Minsky uses the paradox of the smart slave to illustrate how trust functions for 
intelligent agents: “If you keep the slave from learning too much, you are limiting its usefulness. 
But, if you help it to become smarter than you are, then you may not be able to trust it not to 
make better plans for itself…”59 As Minsky’s statement suggests, the issues of machine 
“intelligence” greatly changes the tenor of the question of trust. The crucial difference between a 
purely mechanical technology and an intelligent agent may be represented by the contrast 
between a type writer and a MacBook. While both have the hardware to transmit the operator’s 
touch into words, only one uses autonomous software, performing an array of unseen functions 
and “thinking” in its own coded language. A mechanical technology can further the physical 
endeavors of humans, but a digital technology can work in tandem with the human mind, and 
even have a “mind” of its own. In both cases, the extension of human functioning is at stake, and 
the question of trust cautions the extent to which we can rely on technology to responsibly carry 
out our will. 
The partnership between the human mind and digital tools gives rise to an assimilation 
anxiety, a fear that humans are actually an extension of technology rather than the reverse. Susan 
Sontag claims that the threatening element of this anxiety resides “in man’s ability to be turned 
into a machine.”60 Unlike other anxieties that cast technology and the robot as a fearsome Other 
or insidious force at work, this fear is predicated on the encroachment of technology into one’s 
being, potentially displacing the sense of “humanity” that distinguishes us from an A.I. Schelde 
claims, “Evil robot species…are embodiments of the worst human fear: faceless, unindidivuated, 
totally homogenized but vaguely humanlike creatures. The ultimate evil is that which is 
powerful, very like us, and which we have no emotional or intellectual access too.”61 Apparent in 
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Schedle’s statement is not the fear of an additional presence, as with the replacement anxiety, but 
of an absence of individuality due to assimilation. 
The assimilation anxiety also suggests that the increasingly thin line between human and 
computer validates the perspective that humans are simply organic machines. In her analysis of 
Ghost in the Shell: Innocence, Saralyn Orbaugh claims that the film accentuates that human 
emotion “is no more than an illusion that arises from our own genetically programmed desire to 
experience such emotion.”62 Orbaugh’s criticism accentuates the anxiety that comes with the 
audience’s consubstantiality with the programmed mind and bodily “shell” of the gynoids in the 
film. If we are not already machines made of carbon rather than steel or silicone, our closeness 
with human-manufactured machines illustrates this melding. As bio-medical technologies such 
as prostheses, pacemakers, and cochlear implants continue to advance, “concern grows that we 
might go too far, lose our humanity, and become mere machines.”63 The assimilation anxiety is 
predicated on the belief that there is something special and distinctive about humans that robots, 
as simulacra, challenge. 
The cultural anxieties that technology will replace means of human livelihood, that 
machines will spiral out of our control, and that human beings will lose their humanity as we 
assimilate with machines have been characterized by robots in science fiction film and television. 
These provide a useful foundation for approaching the robot as an embodiment of technological 
anxiety; however, as digital and mechanical technologies rapidly advance, nuances to these 
preconceived anxieties arise in contemporary texts. The case studies I examine reveal some of 
these nuances, as well as adaptations of cultural anxieties to the medium of technology, such as 
apprehensions about data collection by tech industry giants and insecurities about our seemingly 
“private” online activities. Technological anxieties, those acknowledged here as well as those 
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revealed through my case studies, are crucial components of the robot’s symbolic meaning. As a 
robot, the gynoid bears the weight of technological anxieties; but these are not her heaviest 
significations. The gynoid is a cultural symbol of the manufactured woman, her “birth” being 
enabled by technology, capitalism, and patriarchal demand for the perfect woman. In the 
following section, I articulate both fantasies and anxieties the gynoid represents according to 
scholars whose investigations precede my own in order to formulate her foundational meanings 
upon which my case studies build. 
Theorizing the Gynoid 
Just as the robot’s cultural meanings were embodied long before R.U.R., the fantasy of 
the artificially created woman existed in literature dating back through the centuries.64 Before 
demonstrating which anxieties about artificial women present in sci-fi texts, I recall what historic 
embodiments reveal about the motivation behind their manufacturing: namely, the male creation 
fantasy, in which the creator imagines himself as a life-giving God capable of creating perfect 
femininity according to his own standards. 
Several popular and scholarly sources examining artificial women connect them to the 
Greek myth of Pygmalion and Galatea.65 According to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Pygmalion was 
an artist who struggled to relate to women. So he sculpted a beautiful female figure from ivory 
and begged Aphrodite to grant her life.  She did so, and Pygmalion named his creation—and new 
romantic partner—Galatea.66 Today, the science fiction genre is full of Pygmalions, fulfilling 
their “’dream’ of male procreation,” which both diminishes women’s role in reproduction and 
elevates the man to the role of a Creator.67 While the traditional myth casts Pygmalion as a mere 
supplicant of Aphrodite, “manufacturing an ideal female using science in place of divine 
intervention [updates] the Galatea myth, yet with less than ideal results.”68 This fantasy does not 
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imagine genuine partnership; instead, it places the created female primarily as a “shiny surface 
on which male visions of femininity may be etched” and a “projection of [the creator’s] ego.”69 
The relationship between the creator and his creation may be artificially harmonious, but 
inasmuch as manufactured women are effigies of Real ones, the “perfection” she exemplifies has 
problematic implications for gender in our world. 
While the male creation fantasy has been popularized through fictional retellings of the 
Pygmalion/Galatea myth, the sculpting of femininity is a “cultural reality” of patriarchal society, 
which indoctrinates girls “to be the perfect and perfectly obedient companions, greenhouses, 
pleasure objects of men.”70 The roles that gynoids typically fill in science fiction reflect the roles 
patriarchy would assign a Real woman: either that of a domestic servant or a “passive doll whose 
great virtue, by saying practically nothing, is to become a flattering mirror for the man who falls 
in love with her.”71 While unsettling, the conformity of robotic female characters to these roles 
makes perfect sense considering that, like women who internalize patriarchal ideology, they are 
socialized or programmed for that purpose. 
Just as her suitability to patriarchal gender roles makes the gynoid a projection of male 
fantasy, she embodies a replacement anxiety for women. Rather than replace workers, the 
gynoids in fiction and reality are manufactured to imitate female sexual partners. Sex-tech 
industry workers like McCullen, as well as spokespeople for sex doll/robot lifestyles, have been 
explicit about the benefits of dolls and robots as companions for people who struggle to form 
romantic connections.72 Even before the emergence of hyperrealistic sex robots, pornographer Al 
Goldstein admitted that his fantasy was “to come home and hear a robot greet me. My wife 
knows she’s on the way out. She’s like a buffalo. She knows she’s here temporarily until 
technology catches up.”73 Brian Forbes’ The Stepford Wives revolves around the methodical 
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execution and replacement of wives with gynoids in hopes that the synthetic model of “wife” 
will fulfill its domestic and sexual roles more consistently. This gender-based replacement 
anxiety is subsequent to the male creation fantasy, its potentials manifested in science fiction as 
well as the attitudes of real gynoid manufacturers. 
While patriarchy’s fantasies may imagine gynoids as docile replacements for women in 
the home, sci-fi narratives rarely allow them to remain purely figures of desire, casting them 
instead as monstrous manifestations of anxieties about women. The Eve anxiety, which 
erroneously purports that women with too much power and no male supervision will inevitably 
act immorally and harm others in the process, is exemplified by gynoids capable of deception.74 
For instance, in Alex Garland’s Ex Machina, the central gynoid uses her artificial intelligence 
software to dupe both her creator and companion, turning on both in spite of the friendly 
disposition she seemed to possess. Her name is Ava, placing her within the tradition of naming 
gynoids a variation of “Eve”—including EVE (Wall-E), Eve VIII (Eve of Destruction), Ava (The 
Machine), and others. The biblical mythology of Eve is also evoked by pairing gynoids with 
serpents, such as Zhora in Bladerunner or Armistice in Westworld. Female robots are likened to 
the original sinner, the mother of a new species with destructive potential. 
Often in wake of their deceptions, gynoids might kill or attack those who threaten them, 
exacerbating anxieties of the enigmatic violent women. The violent gynoid does exactly the 
opposite of what she is presumed to do according to her creator’s fantasies: instead of docility 
and subservience, the violent gynoid opts for aggression and, presumably, the usurping of control 
from their master. Female violence “doesn’t fit conveniently into our ideas of the feminine, and, 
because of this, it has a disruptive and traumatic impact.” 75 Oftentimes, deception and violence 
combine. This is the case with the gynoids of Ghost in the Shell: Innocence, sex robots 
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manufactured to look like young girls who malfunction and brutally murder their owners. As 
with Ava of Ex Machina, these gynoids actually utilize their inviting, feminine appearance to 
deceive and make vulnerable male victims. The violence anxiety, then, is nuanced by femininity 
in a way quite distinct from male violence, which fits more intelligibly into social constructs of 
masculinity. 
When the gynoid uses her sex-appeal to the ends of deception or violence, she folds into 
those anxieties the dread of monstrous sexuality. Although the sexual desirability of an artificial 
woman is placed upon her by her creator, it can be used as a weapon; “it is in the possession of 
an ‘unnatural sexual attractiveness that the female cyborg’s greatest danger appears to lie.”76 The 
earliest cinematic appearance of the female robot, “False Maria” of Metropolis threatens an 
entire city with a hypnotizing erotic dance, seeking to seduce the workers of the city and 
persuade them to destroy the machines with which they work. A later gynoid, Eve VIII, carries a 
nuclear trigger in her womb, “reinforcing the notion of monstrous female sexuality.”77 The 
“highly eroticized, seductive, and therefore immoral, but desirable” gynoid may juxtapose the 
“good,” inhibited and demure woman, such as Maria versus False Maria in Metropolis, or Zhora 
and Pris versus Rachael in Bladerunner.78 Dichotomous divisions of gynoids into “good” and 
“bad” help to “give the violent woman meaning and allows for her to have a place in the social 
order again. …if we fantasize that the violent woman is a ‘whore,’ we know she has no remorse 
of feelings, and we convict her.” 79 When used for her purposes, the sexuality of a gynoid is a 
cause for anxiety. More often compounded together than existing separately, the Eve anxiety, 
threat of violence, and fear of monstrous sexuality characterize the gynoid as a monster 
allegorically symbolizing patriarchal anxieties about subversive women. 
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The narrative resolution of these anxieties rarely bodes well for the dissenting feminine 
robot. Analyses of media texts featuring monstrous gynoids point to two ways that these 
anxieties can be resolved: either the threat is circumvented through strategy, or the gynoid will 
be punitively destroyed. The fetishistic strategy seizes upon threats presented by the gynoid and 
incorporates them into sexual desire, neutralizing the threats and placing them under control.80 
Louis Kaplan explains that the sexual fetishization of robots is a necrophilic strategy, “evoked by 
the fantasy that living, animate beings are unpredictable or potentially dangerous.”81 She 
explains that containing this fear of a living thing requires an “extinguishing” of life and 
transformation to a non-living entity that will “submit to their desires, wishes, and fantasies.”82 
Monstrous gynoids often evoke abject horror through their resemblance to corpses, forging 
another connection between necrophilia and fetishization of robots.83 While gynoids are already 
technically non-living, lobotomy of their artificial intelligence and programming may constitute 
“de-animation”—in Ex Machina, for instance, the threat of Ava’s memories being “wiped” to 
make room for an update is treated as a death in the narrative, though her body would remain 
intact. Without their software, the gynoids are reduced to sex dolls, more akin to the fantasy 
imagined by male creators than the subversive monster that challenges control. 
If fetishistic control through “mental” de-animation is not an option for those threatened 
by the gynoid, anxieties can also be resolved by annihilating her entirely. When False Maria is 
burned at the stake, “the happy resolution is predicated on the elimination of Otherness, as 
embodied in the…female robot.”84 In Bladerunner, Pris and Zhora are both killed by Deckard 
because they “are emblematic of dangerous female sexuality and duly punished by death, while 
Racheal survives as the only example of acceptable femininity, her previously haughty demeanor 
displaced into vulnerability and dependence upon Deckard.”85 Survival of the gynoid in science 
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fiction “necessitates conforming to approved standards of behavior and generally deferring to 
male authority.”86 Both total destruction and fetishistic incapacitation serve as means of 
alleviating the anxieties that gynoids arouse. 
Narrative resolution being central to the prescription of “symbolic medicine” by the text, 
these findings indicate a general failure of sci-fi films to offer responsible ways of coping with 
erroneous patriarchal anxieties about women. While the alleviation of anxiety through partial or 
complete destruction of these figures certainly does not function in the interest of a feminist 
project, the treatment of dissenting gynoids testifies of the prevalence of patriarchal ideology 
within the genre. My study seeks to contribute to these findings by first examining the nuances 
of technological/gender anxiety embodied by the particular gynoid characters, then identifying 
how the anxieties presented in the texts—whether they are part of the foundational patterns I 
have already identified or novel anxieties pertaining to contemporary issues—are resolved. 
Finally, my investigation will synthesize my findings regarding anxiety embodiment, narrative 
interaction with anxiety, and the texts’ ultimate resolutions in order to articulate how my case 
studies treat the ailment of forward-looking fears.  
Justification of Study 
Cultural anxieties about women and technology are as relevant now as they have ever 
been in the United States. In the presidential election of 2016 alone, misogynist messages that 
condone sexual assault or delineate all women as potential threats to marital fidelity circulated 
through public political discourse.87 Chiefly white male law-makers continue to advance 
legislation seeking to regulate rights and access to reproductive healthcare for women while 
feminists and allies protest before state capitols.88 In our daily lives, Real women still experience 
policing of our femininity according to patriarchal standards, and we continue to navigate the 
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double-binds of gendered expectations. While the gynoid in film sometimes represents an 
oppressive or violent replacement of Real women, its fabricated femininity illuminates the 
artificiality of femininity as it has been culturally reinforced. Just as the male sci-fi scientists 
create their Galateas, patriarchal hegemony seeks to sculpt its narrow image of femininity onto 
Real women. It casts them as symbols rather than agents, creations rather than creators. Fear of 
women exercising control over our own lives, our wages, our sexuality, and our bodies without 
hegemonic allowance continues to evidence itself publically and privately in our lived 
experiences. 
Meanwhile, serious concerns regarding Russian cyber-attacks and Wiki-leaked 
information exemplify the enormous influence that digital technologies can have on public 
opinions and election outcomes.89 As the digitization of the political landscape continues, A.I. 
technologies continue to advance at an alarming rate. In 2017, Facebook programmed and 
subsequently shut down bots which created and began speaking their own language.90 The same 
year, 116 leaders of robotics and A.I. companies sent an open letter to the U.N. urging a ban on 
lethal autonomous weapons for fear that “once developed, they will permit armed conflict to be 
fought at a scale greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can comprehend.”91 
While the shouldering of physical labor by machines has been an aspect of human life since our 
earliest ancestors fashioned stones into tools, machines able to perform the intellectual labor 
previously assigned to humans have only existed for a relative blink of the eye. As evidenced by 
the concerns of experts and designers, cultural anxieties about A.I.s are well-founded, their 
influences extending far beyond fictional imagination. 
My investigation of the gynoid does not present a direction for solution nor advocate for 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of cultural anxieties regarding technology or gender; rather, by 
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using this figure as an embodiment of these, I seek to uncover more about the anxieties 
themselves. I examine the gynoid as a visual symbol of cultural concern to articulate in words 
what this uncanny feminine machine signifies. Centrally, my study asks what depictions of 
robotic women in sci-fi reveal about cultural anxieties toward gender and technology, and 
assesses the effectiveness of the selected texts as “symbolic medicine.” 
  The first chapter uses Forbes’ The Stepford Wives (1975), a film that has been widely 
discussed by critics and feminist scholars since its release when Betty Friedan condemned it as a 
“rip-off of the Women’s Movement.”92 Based on Ira Levin’s novel of the same name, The 
Stepford Wives takes place in the fictional town of Stepford, Connecticut, where Joanna 
(Katherine Ross) and her family move to get away from the “noise” of the city. In stark contrast 
to Joanna’s feminist ideals, most of the other women in Stepford seem obsessed with domestic 
responsibilities like cooking, cleaning, and sexually servicing their husbands. Joanna and her 
friends Bobbie and Charmaine try to bring progressive change to the town, their conversations 
with the other Stepford wives falling on deaf ears. As the narrative progresses, both Charmain 
and Bobbie undergo inexplicable transformations, abandoning their individuality and goals and 
becoming “perfect” housewives. Ultimately, Joanna discovers that the Men’s Association, a club 
comprised of Stepford’s husbands, had been murdering and replacing their wives with robotic 
clones. Her discovery, however, comes too late and Joanna is killed by her own nearly-finished 
replica. 
 Having emerged during a time when the Women’s Liberation Movement was receiving 
national media attention, the parallels between the film and public discourse about women’s 
rights are clear. Although the text has been appraised by many as “feminist,” I claim that it casts 
the gynoid as a figure of feminist rather than patriarchal anxieties and fails to administer 
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sufficient “symbolic medicine” for a progressive audience. In spite of—and in part because of—
its shortcomings, this film serves as an excellent text for this examination; it centralizes issues of 
gender, exemplifying how a film can be both influenced by and commenting on the socio-
political climate. By subduing rather than arousing patriarchal anxieties, these robotic 
replacements shirk the archetype of the castrating monstrous-feminine and become monsters of 
the feminist imagination. 
 Garland’s Ex Machina (2015) serves as the text of my second chapter. When software 
programmer Caleb (Domhnall Gleeson) is selected to participate in a top-secret experiment, he 
flies to the home of the company’s founder and young tech genius Nathan (Oscar Isaac). There, 
Nathan introduces him to Ava (Alicia Vikander), an autonomous feminine robot with self-
learning A.I. and a pretty human face. For the experiment, Caleb need only talk to her from 
behind a glass wall and informally report his impressions of her to Nathan. Witnessing Nathan’s 
verbal abuse of his domestic partner, Kyoko, Caleb’s suspicions of his character begin to grow. 
After learning of Nathan’s plans to update Ava and erase her memories, Caleb and Ava devise a 
plan for her escape. However, Ava outwits both Caleb and Nathan, devising her own plan with 
Kyoko—also an A.I.—and ends the lives of both men before escaping the facility. 
What distinguishes Ava from gynoids of the 20th century is the seemingly infinite 
information that she has access to by grace of her connection to BlueBook (the film’s fictional 
equivalent of Google). Thus, she embodies cultural anxieties about cyberspace, digitization, data 
collection, face recognition software, autonomous machines, self-learning A.I. and other 
technological developments pertinent to the contemporary moment.   
Ava and Kyoko fulfill two of the roles literature discusses as being typical of female 
robots; for Caleb, Ava is designed to be a perfect romantic partner while Kyoko serves Nathan as 
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a sexual and domestic slave. Although programmed to fulfill these roles, both deviate from them 
drastically, ironically utilizing the few advantages they offer in order to free themselves from 
confinement. The potential of these gynoids to not only sabotage their oppressive male creator 
but demonstrate symptoms of true agency exacerbates traditional patriarchal anxieties, and they 
effectively illustrate Minsky’s conundrum of the smart slave. The sexual treatment of the A.I.s, 
foregrounded by Nathan’s conversations with Caleb, comment overtly on the sexual motives of 
their creation, and illustrate the value of the gynoids as objects of both sexual desire—and, 
eventually—monstrosity. 
  Having examined texts from two distinctly different times and with opposite outcomes, in 
my third chapter I turn to HBO’s first season of Westworld, aired in 2016 and directed by 
Johnathon Nolan. A reinvention of the Michael Crichton film released in 1973, it synthesizes the 
anxieties of my two previously studied time periods. The first season takes place in an Old West-
themed amusement park, where guest pay forty-thousand dollars per day to play out fantasies of 
adventure, sexuality, and crime at the expense of hyper-realistic robotic hosts. The hosts are 
programmed to accept the simulation of the park and their reality, and to ignore any information 
that would challenge that reality. Chiefly, the series follows two hosts, Dolores (Evan Rachael 
Wood) and Maeve (Thandie Newton), as they seem to defy their programming and pursue the 
truth about the park and themselves. 
 The contrast between Dolores and Maeve demonstrates the dichotomous nature of 
patriarchal expectations of femininity; Dolores is a blonde-haired daughter of a farmer, while 
Maeve is a Black madam at the local saloon. The treatment of each character throughout the 
series reaffirms Short’s observations about the punishment of gender transgressions via violence; 
Maeve is violently killed multiple times throughout the season while Dolores is more often a 
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victim of rape, fulfilling expectations of ideal white victimhood.93 The explicit depictions of 
violence and sexual actions toward hosts confirm cultural scopophilic fascinations with both, 
especially in the context of the fetishistic relationship onlookers are encouraged to have with the 
gynoid. 
 The park itself serves as an excellent example of Baudrillard’s simulation, an 
encompassing and convincing artificial reality. The theme of Westworld hearkens back to the 
home of the ruggedly masculine cowboy hero. That this particular theme was selected to cater to 
rich privileged guests allows for commentary on crises of masculinity in the postmodern era, as 
well as the commercial value of creating a space of nostalgic regression. Like the robots in 
R.U.R, Westworld uses robots for profit—not for manual labor but for entertainment, especially 
using the simulations of women as sexual commodities. The most recent of my texts, I 
demonstrate how the anxieties suggested by the gynoids and the park itself reflect the cultural 
concerns of today. 
 In addition to the insights each text provides about the time period in which it is set, an 
appraisal of them together allows us to see what the gynoid has come to mean over the past 
several decades. More importantly, the progression of this meaning illuminates the direction of 
popular anxieties regarding gender and anxiety—inasmuch as media serves to address this 




CHAPTER 1: CULTURAL ANXIETIES AND NECROPHILIC FETISHISM IN THE 
STEPFORD WIVES 
 The 1975 film adaptation of Ira Levin’s novel The Stepford Wives has become, in the 
words of Bonnie Dow, “a feminist classic.”94 The film aroused the approval and distain of 
popular critics, feminist scholars, and even Betty Friedan, who called it a “rip-off of the women’s 
movement.”95 Indeed, the film comments directly on the Women’s Liberation Movement and 
many of the issues with which it wrestled: the cult of domesticity, the belittlement of women’s 
careers, and the theft of bodily autonomy at patriarchal hands. The film’s critique of marriage 
aligned with the perspective that the personal is political and demonstrated how patriarchy 
functions as a collective effort. Although the film cast light on many of the deeply-felt concerns 
that feminists articulated at the time, it failed to provide resolution for those fears. Instead, The 
Stepford Wives actualized patriarchal fantasy through the eradication of women and subsequent 
replacement of them with inanimate and subdued robotic doubles.  
 Films function rhetorically as meaningful public discourse.96 They equip audience 
members with ways to perceive and address the world around them, and provide “symbolic 
medicine” to treat social ailments.97 Specifically, horror and sci-fi films address “collective 
fears,” oftentimes by embodying them in the form of monstrous entities and, through narrative, 
suggesting ways for society to cope with these fears.98  
Informed by the symbolic meanings of the monstrous gynoid as an embodiment of 
gendered anxieties and fantasies, my analysis answers Brummett’s call to “assay the medicine” 
that the text prescribes as a solution for the presented issues.99 The criteria of my assessment 
spring from feminist rhetorical criticism, which investigates gendered ideologies and attitudes as 
they present in public discourse. Consulting feminist criticisms of The Stepford Wives, I interpret 
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the film as an allegorical representation, embodying patriarchy and feminist resistance through 
characters. Through the operationalization of those characters, the film presents the death of 
feminist women and, by extension, the death of the feminist movement. I argue that the film fails 
exacerbates, rather than resolves, anxieties of its feminist audience by actualizing a patriarchal 
necrophilic fantasy: the successful extinguishing of life from women in order to exert total sexual 
control over their bodies.  
In order to fully appreciate how The Stepford Wives interacted with audiences of its time, 
I provide a brief plot summary and consider how aspects of production and the context of 
Women’s Liberation Movement limited the film makers’ encoded feminist message. I detail the 
perspectives taken by preceding scholarly criticisms of the film, which support a (limited) 
allegorical interpretation. To these interpretations I add Kaplan’s insights on the sexually 
objectified robot as corpse in a necrophilic fetishizing strategy, which are reinforced by the 
narrative of the film. Ultimately, I articulate how the film utilizes feminists’ anxieties about 
social/spatial isolation, diminution of women’s minds, and retribution for resistance as steps 
towards actualizing and literalizing a punitive necrophilic fantasy. 
A Feminist Horror 
 The Stepford Wives details the story of Joanna, a photographer, wife, and mother who 
“could have leapt from the pages of The Feminist Mystique” as she moves from Manhattan to the 
small town of Stepford with her husband, Walter, and their two children.100 The seemingly 
“idyllic” town with well-kept homes and hyper-domestic wives begins to unsettle Joanna. She 
and her new friend Bobbie grow increasingly suspicious of the Men’s Association, an 
exclusively male club in which their husbands take part. Once their friend, Charmaine, 
undergoes a transformation from a spunky, cigarette-smoking tennis player to a subservient wife 
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stripped of her personality and interests, the women’s doubts intensify to fear, and they suspect 
that there is something in the water—leaked out from all the electrical facilities near town—that 
turns the women in “haus-fraus and drones.” An old flame of Joanna’s, a chemist, dispels this 
hypothesis. However, when Bobbie returns from a get-away with her husband having undergone 
a transformation similar to Charmaine’s, Joanna begins to theorize that something much more 
insidious is going on, anticipating that “her time has come.” Ultimately, her investigation leads 
her to the Victorian mansion out of which the Men’s Association operates. There she meets her 
demise at the hands of her identical robotic replacement.101 Ultimately, all three of the women 
suspicious of their eerie neighbors’ behaviors are murdered and replaced with robotic doubles—
“docile, obedient, utterly compliant creatures.”102 Thus, the film invites viewers to feel 
discomfort with the sequence of events or to take “misogynistic glee in Joanna’s demise” and, by 
extension, the death of the Women’s Movement.103  
The 1970’s were a “volatile time for women in U.S. history,” and the treatment of 
feminist activists in the media certainly reflected that.104 Although it had garnered support at 
least a decade sooner, the loosely-defined Women’s Liberation Movement gained sustained 
national attention in 1970.105 The supposed bra-burning protest of the Miss America Pageant in 
1968 provided ammunition for the media to make the Women’s Movement a laughing stock, and 
to reject the “sexual politics” by radical feminists.106 Rhetorical analyses of news and other 
national media from that era show that anxiety about liberated women was apparent “in 
abundance."107 Feminists were represented as “crazed freaks obsessed with karate,” whose chief 
motives were to destabilize the family.108 Dow quotes Jerry Falwell calling feminism a “satanic 
attack on the home;” indeed,  media narratives centralized radical critiques that politicized 
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marriage and used lesbian feminists as totems of man-hating and sexual deviance in order to 
delegitimize the movement.109 
 These depictions of progressive feminism in popular media exacerbate cultural anxieties 
in terms of the displacement of patriarchal control and power, a unified narrative that intersected 
with the changing lived experiences of the broad U.S. population. By the end of the 1970s, the 
majority of families relied on two wage-earners rather than one, and the working woman was no 
longer an anomaly the norm.110 Although in retrospect the fear that women would actually 
displace men from their work would not come to fruition, the movement of women from the 
“private sphere” to the public in terms of labor and politics irritated patriarchal anxieties about 
the displacement of their roles.  
 The creators of The Stepford Wives were not intending to threaten their feminist audience, 
but their positionalities rendered them woefully oblivious to the reality of the horrors that they 
portrayed, horrors which members of the Movement may have witnessed first-hand: domestic 
slavery, social ostracism, and violence against women. When Columbia Pictures invited a group 
of women’s liberation activists—include Betty Friedan—to a screening of the film, the audience 
reacted with “hisses, groans, and guffaws” and Friedan left the room, outraged.111 Nanette 
Newman recalled her husband, director Bryan Forbes, telling her that after a different screening, 
“some madwoman attacked me with an umbrella and told me that I’m anti-women” though he 
claimed, “If anything, its anti-men!”112 Although this audience of feminist activists perceived the 
film as problematic, it financially benefitted the film to appeal to a broader and more general 
audience than just activists. The Stepford Wives sought to enter a national conversation on gender 
politics without a sufficient understanding of the Movement itself.  
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 While highly experienced and well-regarded in their crafts, the filmmakers were industry 
elitists focused more on the artistic elements of a horror “in sunlight” than on how the film’s 
message would interact with the rhetoric of and surrounding the Movement. 113 Forbes was a 
British director, who took on The Stepford Wives later in his career, and whose vision for the 
film often conflicted with that of screenwriter William Goldman. When Forbes cast Newman, his 
wife, in the role of Carol, Goldman felt that he had to adjust the “look” of all of the other 
Stepford wives, who he initially intended to resemble playboy bunnies rather than housewives.114 
These artists possessed the ability to present effective horror, but internal fractures and 
differences in vision hindered the cohesiveness of the final product, and failure to account for 
women’s actual voices limited its critique. 115 
While the initial reactions of feminist audiences was poor, The Stepford Wives has 
nonetheless endured as a cult classic, and as an intriguing engagement with issues of gender for 
its time, and interpretations on its success vary. Anna Silver praises it as an indication of feminist 
rhetoric’s “success and popular appeal,” while Friedan’s critique suggests that it was an 
appropriation and perversion of the same rhetoric.116 Dow critiques the film for its insufficient 
explanation of the motives for patriarchy—a question that “second wave feminists spent a fair 
amount of time trying to explain.”117 The Men’s Association, the all-male club of Stepford 
orchestrating the murder and replacement of the wives, symbolizes systematic patriarchy, but its 
motive as a group does not sufficiently explain the motives of the individual husbands. I add to 
Dow’s critique that the Men’s Associations also fails to represent the hegemonic nature of 
patriarchy as an ideology, not merely a system of governance, internalized and perpetuated by 
individuals outside the exclusively male circle. While Silver’s assertion that the film as 
allegorical is abundantly supported, Dow’s critique illustrates the limits of that representational 
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strategy. An allegorical perspective is useful for investigating how symbolized anxieties are 
treated in the film—while the metaphor has boundaries, the narrative nonetheless instructs the 
audience on how to interact with its tenor. 
As Brummett has indicated, the resolution of fear in a film will provide the audience with 
motives, or “equipment” for managing their fear; by eradicating the force of women one wife at 
a time, the film is actually providing subliminal attitudes for patriarchal audience members. As 
indicated by the colossal failure of Frank Oz’s 2004 post-feminist remake, which included a 
flatly optimistic ending in which the wives of Stepford are remarkably restored their humanity, 
resolution alone does not render the text effective or ineffective equipment.118 The figure of the 
Stepford robot itself is a tool for processing anxiety, its presence providing a form of equipment 
that resolution alone cannot explain. However, insight into the symbolic meaning of the gynoid 
illuminates how the film as a whole suggests audiences treat the threat of feminist activism. 
Fantasy and Anxiety 
Since their introduction into 20th century science fiction texts like R.U.R and Metropolis, 
gynoids have symbolized both anxieties and fantasies about women from patriarchal 
perspectives, sometimes even simultaneously. While most pop-culture gynoids actualize the 
male creation fantasy, which imagines the creator as uplifted to the status of a paternal God, 
many of these eventually turn on their creators, agitating the Eve anxiety—that women will act 
immorally if given power without supervision. Even with their potentials for representing and 
actualizing anxiety, however, the gynoid is still steeped in patriarchal fantasy. In both popular 
culture and lived reality, gynoids are often manufactured for the express purpose of sexual 
engagement. They are given hyperreal feminine sex characteristics and their dispositions are 
programmed, making them tailored to patriarchal values regarding women as objects. Although 
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gynoids may represent patriarchal anxieties through narratives that cast them as subverting their 
master’s will, they are still marked as sexual objects through non-reproductive hypersexual 
physicality and their associations with patriarchal fantasies, such as male creation and superficial 
feminine perfection. 
As an entity that simultaneously threatens and arouses, the female robot is a “site of an 
over-determining fetishistic desire.”119 Sexual fetishization of robots is a necrophilic fantasy, 
Kaplan explains, predicated on the belief that animate human beings are dangerous and 
unpredictable. 120 Fetishism here functions as a negotiation of the tension between sexual desire 
and fear. Although necrophilia is denotatively an erotic attraction towards human corpses, 
gynoids share the qualities necessary to be taken as necrophilic objects: they are artificial women 
rendered inanimate and void of consciousness, and are therefore non-threatening towards the 
necrophiliac. However, the narratives into which the gynoid is placed can alter their meanings; 
even as sexualized creations, gynoids can be subversive, directing their “monstrosity” towards 
hegemonic systems or oppressive creators and refusing the role of object or corpse. 
The narrative of The Stepford Wives encourages the necrophilic strategy by reaffirming 
the belief that living women are a threat to men and presenting the subservient gynoid as a 
favorable replacement—but only after the lives of the women are extinguished and their threat 
neutralized. Thus, for audiences sympathetic to patriarchy, the potential of the gynoid as bearer 
of anxiety is undermined. For a feminist audience, the gynoids of Stepford exemplify anxieties 
about the failure of their mission and death of the Women’s Liberation Movement. The 
necrophilic fantasy is not well-suited for feminist viewers, especially given that the murdered 
characters were, themselves, members of the Movement. While opponents of gendered 
subversion are invited to participate in a fantasy of its demise, feminists themselves are left 
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neither resolution nor “equipment” to manage anxieties, but are instead presented a parody of 
oppression that doubles as a threat of extinction. 
 In the analysis that follows, I demonstrate how the narrative of The Stepford Wives 
actualizes the necrophilic fetish by casting patriarchy as the necrophiliac and feminists as the 
victim, detailing the processes of isolation, diminution, and retribution as strategies for the de-
animation of women and, by extension, the Women’s Liberation Movement.  
Isolation 
 The first step towards the imagined end of the Movement is women’s isolation from one 
another. From the initial move away from New York to her final hours in the mansion, Joanna’s 
doom is insured by her intensifying spatial and social isolation from the Women’s Movement 
and Real women. The sets of the film communicate spatial isolation, especially through 
regression. New York symbolizes a progressive counterculture, a fertile soil for the growth of 
feminist thought and action. New York is a “noisy” place where the sight of a naked female 
mannequin is no uncommon sight—much to the distain of Walter and the fascination of Joanna, 
who snaps a picture of the mannequin in the opening scene of the film. In contrast to New York 
as progressive, cosmopolitan, and full of diversity, the town of Stepford performs a nostalgic 
regression to post-war “domestic bliss,” a suburban haven for the maintenance of a family and 
traditional values where the “noise” of the Movement is muted to a distant echo. These opposing 
spaces represent the ideologies of those within them. Displacing Joanna into a space and 
community that strongly reinforces patriarchy isolates her from the safety of others in the 
Movement. 
The residents of Stepford are critical of Joanna’s former home, which reinforces the town’s 
rejection of feminism. When Carol, a Stepford wife, gets in a car accident outside of the 
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supermarket, an ambulance races to her rescue in six minutes. A male onlooker remarks, “Think 
you could get ambulance service better than this anywhere else in the world? Two hours you’d 
wait in New York!” Asserting the superiority of the services in Stepford against New York 
implies a praise of small-town life and the functionality of a male-led system, especially for the 
protection and benefit of the women. Later, when Carol “gets drunk” at a gathering and repeats a 
portion of her script several times, her husband and the other men force Carol to apologize to 
Joanna and Bobby. Carol reveals that her alcoholism motivated the couple’s move to Stepford, 
saying, “the drinking was getting so bad and he blamed the city and all its pressures.” That Carol 
was once part of the Women’s Movement reinforces New York’s association with progressive 
gender politics, corroborating the onlooker’s critique that the city (and, broadly, gendered 
subversion), is detrimental to women. Physically separate from the city, Joanna is isolated from 
the safety of the Women’s Movement, which relied in part on consciousness-raising and 
collective action to gain momentum.121 
Aesthetically, Stepford resembles the post-war era through its continuity. The Victorian 
mansion out of which the Men’s Association operates symbolizes the furthest isolation and 
regression, when social constraints for women in the western world were even more tightly laced 
than in the post-war era, long before the suffragists at the turn of the century pushed up against 
social norms for women. The fixtures of Stepford—the homes, the cars, and the artificial 
women—constitute an area that seems to move back in time, reversing the “progressive” march 
of the Women’s Movement. 
While the spatial elements constitute Joanna’s isolation, her social isolation is temporarily 
reprieved through Bobby and Charmaine, the Real women of Stepford. Though the remedy does 
not last, the friendships she builds with these two women provide the feminist viewer with a 
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treatment for the isolation anxiety: even in a place like Stepford, women can unify and find 
community with one another. The friendship between Bobby and Joanna exemplify Eve 
anxieties, the pair are seen drinking scotch, smoking cigarettes, eating store-bought snack cakes, 
and making fun of the Men’s Association—all actions that go against the values of Stepford. 
Charmaine similarly defies these values and patriarchal ownership, smoking cigarettes and 
owning a tennis court, which her husband tears up after her replacement. As the men murder 
Charmaine, Bobby, and Joanna one at a time, each death furthers the isolation of the remaining 
women. The dissolving of their resistance alleviates the worries of the Men’s Association, to 
whom female unity is a threat. 
 The temporary strategy of unity fails when the Real women try to start a consciousness-
raising group. Initially, all of the Stepford wives turn down the opportunity, citing their 
“busyness” with domestic chores and their children as justifications. In order to persuade the 
wives to attend the group, Joanna negotiates with Claude, a husband and member of the 
Association. In an ironic twist, Joanna must work through patriarchy in order to undermine it. 
When the group meets, however, the concerns that the robotic wives bring forward revolve 
around housework and products that can help them save time cleaning. In terms of their 
concerns, Charmaine, Bobby, and Joanna are unable to find comrades, and their attempt to bring 
change to the gendered culture of Stepford utterly fails. This suggests an apprehension that 
strength in numbers is limited, as not all women were welcoming towards feminists.  
 Because spatial and social isolation mean failure for the cause of gender-equality and 
danger for individual women, the story and resolution of the film equip feminists with a 
reinforcement of our fears. The presentation of isolation within the film acts as a precursor to the 
women’s murders, creating a sense of anticipation for onlookers as they consider the dangers for 
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a woman left alone with men who would subjugate her to a role she resists. Isolation from other 
feminists will inevitably result in eradication of the ideology and of the individual. 
Diminution 
  The process of diminishing, the shrinking of women and their issues to insignificance, 
makes women’s cries for help unintelligible to the community. This process may involve 
dismissal by others or the deadly “hysterical” label that medicalizes liberated woman as mentally 
unstable. Through their murder and (re)programming of women, the Men’s Association 
diminishes their minds all the way to non-existence, the body remaining intact in its new form. 
Before Joanna is dead, the Men’s Association diminishes her intellect while simultaneously 
appropriating her physical appearance for the purpose of her replication. During a Men’s 
Association meeting in her home, they pretend not to hear her contributions, the artist of the 
group sketching the details of her face and body throughout the meeting. They do not value her 
mental presence, only her physical contributions. As they inflate the importance of the body as 
an object of sexual and visual pleasure, they deflate the importance of the living mind and 
consciousness. 
 In addition to their bodies, the Men’s Association use the inflation/deflation technique 
through the appropriation of the women’s voices. Rather than the shouts of protests, or the 
intellectual contributions possible from a Real woman’s voice, the Men’s Association wants to 
fetishize this voice, permitting its existence only inasmuch as it suits their desires, removing the 
intentionality behind their words. They want to hear their robot wives speak, but only if her 
words are actually their words, being repeated back to them, such as when Frank’s wife calls 
Frank “the king,” “the champion,” and “the master,” all within the same broken sentence during 
their intercourse. The inflated voice and deflated mind is also exemplified by the wives 
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justifications against the consciousness-raising group, which diminish feminist concerns with the 
very voices of women murdered by their husbands. The inflation/deflation technique exemplifies 
necrophilia by diminishing agency, aiding in the victim’s transformation from subject to object. 
 The film conflates women’s anxiety with psychosis, citing the Movement and feminist 
concerns as the source of Carol’s alcoholism and Joanna’s hysteria. Having collected from 
women the qualities they value and diminished the qualities that they do not value—intellect, for 
instance—the men must diminish the Real woman’s autonomy and subjectivity, especially her 
ability to be taken seriously as a mind. Hysteria, or the imagined psychosis of subversive women, 
is an erroneous but effective way for patriarchs to characterize opponents as “dangerous.” 
Joanna’s husband does this to her by labelling her as “crazy” and suggesting she see a therapist. 
Although he recommended she see one of the “top-notch guys in town” for treatment, Joanna 
opts to meet with a female therapist out of town, who affirms the severity of her concerns rather 
than confirming her insanity as her husband accuses. The film’s depiction of Joanna as a 
hysterical threat intensifies when she nearly runs over children at a school bus stop on her way 
out of Bobby’s house. This particular instance reaffirms patriarchal anxieties about a rogue 
woman, a hysteric who perverts the role of mother by threatening her children.  
The diminutive label of “hysterical” is a source of anxiety for women considering the 
consequences of containment, but some also fear the possibility of internalizing that label. After 
Carol expresses the joy she takes in housework and child-rearing, Bobby says to Joanna, “Maybe 
we’re the crazy ones,” and Joanna quickly counters with, “Don’t say that, we’re not.” Bobby’s 
insecurity invokes fears that by deviating from patriarchal traditions, feminists really are doing 
something wrong, and that their futile efforts are ill-founded. Whether hysteria is internalized or 
only labelled, the effect is the same: a shrinking of women’s minds to favor an inflation of their 
 
39 
bodies. Diminishment justifies a “treatment,” and the medicine for that treatment is the same 
symbolic medicine that treats patriarchal anxieties: a neutralization of the threat and retribution 
for its harms.  
Retribution 
 Having isolated and diminished the living woman, the group effort of executing her 
actualizes and completes the procession of the necrophilic fetish, de-animation neutralizing the 
anxieties women present in a very physical, literal way. Both the killing itself (a temporary 
process) and the death of the body (a permanent state) serve purposes within the necrophilic 
fetish. While the killing serves the social function of punishment for activists’ resistance, the 
transformation of the body from living to dead, subject to object, is more important than the 
enacting of violence—the although the men chose a fetishtic strategy to circumvent the threat of 
women, their motives are driven by a fantasy of perfect femininity. This is why Joanna is 
ultimately killed by her robotic double instead of by her husband or the Men’s Association first 
hand; as the necrophiliac, patriarchy’s need centers on the dead body rather than the violence 
necessary to procure one. 
Through their sexual availability and domestic servitude, the robotic wives resolve the 
men’s fear of their otherwise displaced roles or sexual rejection while exacerbating the fear of a 
female viewer, who is reminded that consent is not necessary for these men’s derivation of 
sexual pleasure, especially after those bodies fulfill the compulsory purpose of heterosexual 
reproduction. The men end their wives’ lives and sexually engage with representations of them 
through their robotic replacements. These can neither consent nor dissent to sex but only submit, 
like Carol when her husband gropes her in the middle of her gardening. The film ultimately 
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threatens that the body of a woman is still an available site for sexual engagement, even devoid 
of a life and mind. 
 The permanence of death presents one limit of the allegorical representation; while a 
human woman may be literally killed, a movement cannot be “killed” as absolutely and 
assuredly. Thus, an effective way for patriarchy to ensure the Movement itself “dies” is to create 
a regressive world in which gender subversion seemed to never exist at all. It is not enough for 
the men of Stepford to try to recreate the past; they must insure their future survival as the 
“stronger” sex by eradicating the other and replacing her with their own creation.  
 Crucially, The Stepford Wives casts the robot as once again replacing the human—but 
instead of threatening to displace men from their jobs, they threaten to replace women from their 
existence as patriarchy values them: sexual objects and domestic slaves. In this way, the film 
strips the gynoid of its potential as a threat to the patriarchy and cast it instead as a threat to 
women and an object of necrophilic fantasy. Ultimately, it is not Dis or Walter who takes 
Joanna’s life, it is the gynoid built in her likeness, differing only its enhanced breasts and 
unfinished eyes, black and void of any glee when it approaches Joanna with a stocking to 
presumably strangle her. Here, the female robot brings about the death of women, but also the 
death of feminist ideology. She represents the “corpse” of both the woman and the Movement 
she represents: feminine appearance is reaffirmed as sexually valuable, but all subversive and 
threatening aspects of the body have been lobotomized. Patriarchy here is internalized literally 
through programming rather than socially through the power of norms. A gynoid cannot defy its 
programming, so it cannot defy the patriarchy. It cannot raise consciousness when it has no 
consciousness or complaints to raise. Inanimate, controllable, programmable, and mutable to the 
liking of its owner, Kaplan demonstrates that the robot is intrinsically an object of necrophilic 
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pleasure; operationalized in the narrative of The Stepford Wives, this necrophilic perspective is 
literalized and encouraged. 
Conclusion 
 The Stepford Wives was encoded as—and has been considered—a feminist cult classic. 
There are several reasons that a dominant decoding of the film as “feminist” is well-supported; it 
commented on issues and gendered dynamics in a fresh and timely way, and demonstrated the 
horror of domestic and sexual oppression through the eyes of a female protagonist. It places its 
emphasis on ideological horror through monstrous embodiment and narrative, discouraging 
identification with male characters and instead encouraging the audience to view “safe” places 
and relationships, like marriage, neighborly friendship, and grocery stores, as threatening. Like 
Rosemary’s Baby, this perspective encourages audiences to think more dimensionally about 
threats within the “private sphere,” which impacted women relegated to traditional roles. 
 Acknowledging the praiseworthy aspects of the film, its critique failed to incorporate 
actual feminist voices and instead reaffirmed the gynoid’s symbolic meaning as an object of 
necrophilic fantasy. This fantasy is literalized through the narrative by presenting a process that 
begins with disbursing the unity of the Movement, progresses to the diminution of women’s 
humanity, and results in the de-animation of the body for the purpose of total sexual control. 
While Kaplan’s conceptualization of the robot as invoking the necrophilic strategy offers deep 
insight into the symbolic meaning of the gynoid, my analysis of The Stepford Wives 
demonstrates how the narrative in which the fetishized object is placed adds complexity to its 
meaning; even as this film reaffirmed the idea of the gynoid-as-corpse, films which cast 
monstrous gynoids as machines of resistance and subversion might challenge that conflation. 
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 Conversely, failure to acknowledge the meaning of a figure such as the robot may lead to 
unforeseen side effects to the film’s symbolic medicine, as the figure itself holds its own 
meaning. While narrative and resolution instruct the audiences on ways to cope with their 
anxiety, the embodiment of that anxiety through a monstrous figure is also useful as medicine. 
Considering its broader context as a signifier of both patriarchal fantasy and social anxiety, my 
argument demonstrates how the gynoid may not only perform fantasy/anxiety at different times 
within a narrative, but may perform both simultaneously for different specific audiences; this 
duality of meaning may have been advantageous for the reception of the film by the general 
audience, as well. The threat that the gynoid presents is aimed at women, and members of the 
Women’s Liberation Movement more specifically. For other audiences, both those who actively 
opposed the Movement and those who accepted the mainstream media’s unflattering and 
monolithic interpretation of feminism, the gynoid is the means by which apprehension is 
alleviated.  
Even decoded as symbolic medicine for the patriarchal viewer, the film’s function as a 
panacea has notable limitations, especially as the historical moment is now decades past, and 
both feminist and patriarchal approaches have adapted to suit new moments and new audiences. 
The allegorical symbols of the film are fictional caricatures: feminists at the time were not so 
united as Joanna, Bobby, and Charmaine, the rifts between liberal and radical feminists creating 
significant divides in the Movement. The Men’s Association, meanwhile, represented a small 
functioning patriarchy, not a global hegemonic ideology. The presentation of the Men’s 
Association suggests that violence and oppression toward women is pointedly intentional, a 
group effort, rather than an insidious cultural habit performed by individuals, intentionally and 
unintentionally, consciously and subconsciously. The allegorical representations in the film 
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simplify the complexities of both feminism and patriarchy, so the critique is limited to the 
confines of their embodiments. 
As I have demonstrated using Kaplan’s conflation of the gynoid with necrophilic fetishes, 
how a text performs embodiments of anxiety and operationalizes them through narrative may 
ultimately serve to medicate a different ailment or a different patient than it intended in its 
encoded prescription.122 In this case, although The Stepford Wives exposes patriarchal atrocities, 
it simultaneously gives viewers a way to engage in the fantasy of de-animation and control, 
encouraging a subconsciously oppressive perspective that it outwardly seeks to critique. The 
film’s resolution actually reaffirms the validity of feminists’ anxieties via the gynoid, its 
subversive potential as a monster of patriarchal fear spun on its mechanized heel to threaten the 




CHAPTER 2: DIGITAL ANXIETIES AND SUBVERSIVE IDENTIFICATION IN EX 
MACHINCA 
On June 21, 2016, Mark Zuckerberg, multibillionaire and co-founder of Facebook, posted 
a photo to his personal account celebrating the company’s acquisition of Instagram. In the photo, 
his smiling face is centralized in a card-board cut-out version of an Instagram frame, his humble 
and cluttered work desk in the background. Ironically, Facebook was not the platform on which 
Zuckerberg’s photo went viral, and the acquisition of Instagram became mere subtext to the story 
the image told. Instead, Zuckerberg’s laptop became the central object of concern. Twitter user 
Chris Olsen (@topherolsen) tweeted the photograph with a caption pointing out, “Camera 
covered with tape. Mic jack covered with tape. Email client is Thunderbird.” Less than one day 
later, The New York Times published a piece on Olsen’s observation, detailing the rationale 
behind these mundane security measures: webcams and audio can be turned on and their feeds 
accessed fairly easily by voyeurs with the right software—and even more easily by 
manufacturers and big tech companies, including Zuckerberg’s.123  
Later that year, FBI Director James Comey also justified taping his personal webcam, 
saying, “There’s some sensible things you should be doing, and that’s one of them.”124 Security 
measures such as covering one’s webcam and audio jack may safeguard users from their private 
feeds becoming black-market commodities. In 2014, the FBI launched its largest global cyber 
operation at the time and arrested criminals in a dozen different countries for using a program 
called Blackshades to sell and purchase access to webcams, audio, and even files on the 
computer: the going cost for access to a female user’s computer was $1, while the same amount 
could grant access to 100 male user’s computers.125 Access to this personal, and often intimate, 
user data has a disturbing array of implications: one user collected nude images of Cassidy Wolf, 
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2013’s Miss California Teen USA, via her webcam and threatened to expose them unless she 
agreed to send more images. 126 The prospect of cybercriminals accessing an unknown number of 
victim’s devices and monetizing user’s private data is chilling. However, the black market for 
user data is relatively small compared to the legal market for personal data: instead of voyeurs 
and identity thieves, marketing companies constitute the demand. Instead of cybercriminals, tech 
companies such as Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon are eager to sell as much data as their 
privacy policies and user permissions allow, which explains Zuckerberg’s third privacy measure: 
his use of Thunderbird, Mozilla’s underdeveloped email client. 
In 2014, Google confirmed that any email sent or received in a Gmail account—in 
addition to other unspecified “content”—is scanned and analyzed by “automated systems” in 
order to “provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, 
tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection.”127 Other popular applications, platforms, 
and devices use similar methods to customize user’s experience online, while selling data it to 
advertisers. Unlike the practices enabled by Blackshades, of course, these practices are entirely 
legal and somewhat transparent, being detailed in terms of service.  
Even so, consumers rightfully worry that tech industries overstep ethical boundaries. In 
2016, Facebook denied accusations that they covertly enabled the microphones on devices with 
Facebook’s software for the purposes of user profiling. PJ Vogt, podcaster of “Reply All” invited 
Twitter users to recall times that advertisements in their newsfeed appeared in relation to verbal 
conversations. Vogt received hundreds of replies, many presenting compelling evidence for the 
theory.128 Operating systems, such as Window’s Cortana, Amazon’s Alexa, and Apple’s Siri, all 
of which are voice-enabled (and female-presenting), have come under scrutiny from the public, 
given that they are “always listening” to their surroundings, waiting for the “wake word,” to 
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actively engage with users. These operating systems upload interaction data back to their 
respective company’s servers, making them more valuable to the companies than they may be to 
the users.129 
Although Zuckerberg and Comey take measures to limit access to their personal data, the 
majority of tech consumers are either blissfully unaware of the data-profiling industry or, as one 
journalist put it, users may know but still “bow to the God of convenience.”130 Selling user data 
is lucrative, and many free services offered by Google and Facebook remain free because of 
users’ passive complacency in being monitored. After all, user-profiling through data can 
sometimes be for consumers’ benefit, as they will see content and search results more relevant to 
their lives—at least from the perspective of the A.I.s and advertisers. Still, the commodification 
of personal information is a rightful cause for alarm: users have little say in what information is 
collected, how their data is used, or to whom it is sold. 
Oftentimes, cultural anxiety about this surveillance is located as uneasiness with the 
devices themselves rather than the industries selling the data, perhaps because we view our 
devices as personified actors. Mechanically speaking, many devices can see, hear, speak, read, 
and write. They can perform an astounding number of functions quickly and efficiently, earning 
many devices the label of “smart,” e.g. “smartphone.” Oftentimes, devices address users in the 
first person, using phrases such as “I’m sorry,” or “I didn’t understand that.” In the case of 
personal assistants like Siri and Alexa, these devices have personality traits and can tell jokes, 
carry a conversation, and wittingly respond to questions about their own self-awareness. 
Fundamentally, interactive A.I.s are designed to imitate human function.131 So to use language 
that personifies these devices makes sense, and it reinforces the idea that our devices are “smart,” 
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always listening and always watching, spies that we purchase and place in intimate spaces like 
kitchens and bedrooms. 
 As technologies evolve, so do the cultural anxieties that are directed towards them. 
Embodiments of robots in the 1920’s, such as in R.U.R and Metropolis, suggested anxieties 
towards the machines of the industrial revolution: chiefly, replacement and lost control. These 
anxieties remain central in many robot films, but they are often accompanied by anxieties that 
are specific to new technologies or new functions. Kibby points out that digitization in the 
1980’s caused a shift in the technological anxieties embodied by robots: “it is not the threat that 
machines created for man's benefit will make him expendable, but the fear that man will be 
incorporated by the machine, that is the narrative focus.” Just as digitization added a new 
element of anxiety, the rise of Web 2.0 in 1999, the popularization of social media sites in the 
2000s, and the introduction of Siri and other personal assistants in the 2010s have blown open 
the doors of forward-looking social imaginary, especially our fears. 
 Alex Garland, novelist and screenwriter, addresses the anxieties of our “information age” 
in his directorial debut, Ex Machina (2015). The central figure of the film, Ava, embodies 
nuanced cultural concerns about digital, networked technologies while performing traditional 
feminine robot behavior. As she is operationalized within the narrative, the film critiques the 
very anxieties and tropes Ava initially embodies. In this chapter, I argue that the film serves as 
productive symbolic medicine by redirecting technological anxieties away from devices 
themselves and toward the surveilling practices of technological industries. Further, the film 
encourages identification with the subversive gynoid, rejecting masculinity and punishing 
patriarchal fantasies broadly and as they pertain to the tech industry. Before offering my analysis 
of the film, I provide a brief plot summary and consult paratexts, including Garland’s New York 
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Times op-ed, in order to illuminate the technological and cultural perspectives influencing Ex 
Machina’s production and reception. Further, I review popular feminist criticisms of the film in 
conjunction with scholarly literature to consider how the film simultaneously embodies and 
critiques tropes of masculinity, femininity, and fantasy. 
Digital Anxieties in Ex Machina 
The film begins when Caleb (Domnhall Gleeson), an employee of a massive search-
engine company called BlueBook, wins a trip to founder and CEO Nathan’s (Oscar Isaac) 
secluded mountain estate and research facility. Once he arrives, Nathan persuades Caleb to sign a 
thorough non-disclosure agreement before asking him to assess his latest project: a feminine 
robot named Ava (Alicia Vikander). Over the course of a week, Caleb participates in a number 
of conversational “sessions” with her. Initially, Caleb is professionally impressed by Ava’s 
language abilities and the complexities of her programming; but as time goes on, with Nathan’s 
encouragement, Caleb develops a romantic affection for Ava, who appears to reciprocate these 
attractions. During their sessions, Ava triggers power-cuts to the facility’s main generator, which 
causes the security cameras to fail. When they are not being watched, Ava expresses distrust for 
Nathan and cautions Caleb against forming a friendship with him on account of his dishonesty 
about “everything.” Indeed, Nathan’s locker-room talk about Ava, his verbal abuse of his 
mysteriously mute companion, Kyoko (Sonoya Mizuno), and his alcoholism stoke Caleb’s 
distain for him, which reaches fever-pitch when he reveals his plans to “upgrade” Ava, which 
would result in the destruction of her alleged consciousness.  
Unnerved by the prospect, Caleb begins conspiring with Ava to help her escape with him. 
The plan backfires when Ava and Kyoko—also a gynoid—hatch a plan of their own. As a result 
of Caleb’s preparations, all the doors of the facility open when Ava triggers a power-cut. When 
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Nathan tries to re-contain Ava, the gynoids detachedly stab him to death and Kyoko is “killed” in 
the struggle. Before her escape, Ava adorns herself with the synthetic skin of older, de-
commissioned models until she appears convincingly human. Rather than elope with Caleb, and 
in spite of his desperate protests, Ava leaves him locked alone in a room of the facility. The final 
scenes show Ava leaving the facility awe-struck and smiling, wandering through the surrounding 
forest and boarding the helicopter meant for Caleb’s return. Ultimately, we see her standing at a 
busy pedestrian intersection, taking in her surroundings and enjoying her freedom alone. 
Ex Machina is an independent British film, released in the United States on April 24, 
2015. The film was well-received in both the U.S. and the U.K., winning four British 
Independent Film awards, Critic’s Choice for Best Sci-Fi, and an Academy Award for Best 
Visual Effects. Ex Machina emerged during a “glut of A.I. releases” including Her (2013), The 
Machine (2013), Chappie (2015), Transcendence (2015), Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015).132 In 
his op-ed, published two days before the film, Garland speculates that these “cautionary tales” 
about A.I. emerged as a result of escalating cultural “paranoia,” stemming “from a general 
disconnect in our relationship with technology,” particularly given rapid advances in predictive 
software and data profiling for marketing purposes.133  
Concerns about digital A.I. have persisted culturally since the possibility of an intelligent 
computer emerged toward the end of WWII, when Alan Turing created a computer capable of 
breaking the “Enigma” code in Nazi communications.134 In 1948, AI developer Norbert Wiener 
feared “widespread social acceptance of slave labor by machines as substitutes for human 
work.”135 Garland quotes similar warnings from prominent tech figures such as Stephen 
Hawking, Steve Wozniak of Apple, and Elon Musk of Tesla, who claims that that AI is 
“potentially more dangerous than nukes.”136 In addition to these figures, caution toward AI 
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development exists broadly in software and robotics industries, marked by a collective letter by 
developers to the U.N. urging a ban of “autonomous weapons.” 137 The consideration of 
roboethics in organizations such as the International Society for Ethics and Information 
Technology, Responsible Robotics, and the Union of Concern Scientists, among others, speak to 
the very real ethical risks of advanced AI development. 
For the wider public, however, Garland locates digital anxieties as resting too heavily on 
technologies themselves. He argues: 
“The thing with an agenda is us: consumers, who want to buy the machines, and 
manufacturers, who want to sell them. And looming over both, giant tech companies, 
whose growth only ever seems to be exponential, whose practices are opaque, and whose 
power is both massive and without true oversight. Combine all this with government 
surveillance and lotus-eating public acquiescence, and it’s not the machine component 
that scares me. It’s the human component.”138 
 
By articulating the relationships between human-operated nodes of the technological industry, 
Garland implicates them—rather than personified devices—as the truly dangerous social actors. 
His critical eye looks up toward those in positions of power, whether that power is granted by the 
state, by profit, or by access to data. He also looks around at consumers and the public, 
implicating the average citizen for complacency in the tech industry’s nebulous practices. 
Meanwhile, Garland views intelligence machines favorably. He envisions an idealistic future for 
them, performing “public works” in fields like healthcare. He views them as more “reasonable” 
than humans, and with “a completely different relationship with mortality.”139 Garland argues 
that when humans as a species go extinct, “what will survive on our behalf is the AIs—if we 
manage to create them.” While viewing humans pessimistically, Garland’s view liberates 
machines from misplaced cultural anxiety. 
 As both screenwriter and director, Garland had the creative license to champion his views 
in Ex Machina, which he called a “pro-AI movie.”140 The film captures many of the dynamics of 
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the tech-industry assemblage detailed in his op-ed, at times engaging voices of anxiety directly. 
For instance, when discussing the possibility of “updating” Ava, Caleb and Nathan allude to J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, creator of the nuclear bomb, comparing the AI to a weapon of mass 
destruction as Musk did. In the same scene, Nathan says, “One day, the AIs will look back on us 
the same way we look at fossil skeletons from the plains of Africa. An upright ape, living in dust, 
with crude language and tools: all set for extinction.”141 Garland re-articulates his own vision for 
the future through this statement. 
 In another crucial scene, Garland sets up his critique of the tech industries, particularly 
their “massive” power without oversight and surveilling practices. In the lab where Ava was 
created, Nathan explains to Caleb how he used consumer data via Bluebook to enhance Ava’s 
facial and vocal recognition abilities:  
“Almost every cell phone has a camera, a microphone, and a means to transmit data. So I 
switched on all the mics and cameras, across the entire fucking planet, and redirected the 
data through Blue Book. Boom. A limitless resource of facial and vocal interaction…and 
all the manufacturers knew I was doing it. But they couldn’t accuse me without admitting 
they were also doing it themselves.”142 
 
The continuity between Garland’s views as expressed in his op-ed and the arguments that the 
film makes as a whole is reinforced by statements such as these, which articulate the 
relationships between nodes of the tech industry. The major characters of the film embody and 
represent these nodes. Nathan, as CEO of Bluebook, represents big tech, Caleb represents the 
informed consumer, and Ava and Kyoko represent technologies themselves. How Garland 
operationalizes these representations within the narratives also demonstrates continuity with his 
views: ultimately, Nathan and Caleb are punished for their respectively active and passive 
participations in surveillance via technology. 
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 The redirection of cultural anxiety away from technologies themselves and towards the 
practices of the tech industry is productive: by implicating the “human component,” Garland’s 
view illuminates how actors within this assemblage must change, and illustrates that there is risk 
for all parties so long as complacency in surveillance continues. While his technological critique 
is his strongest, Garland comments much less on the critique of gender present in Ex Machina. In 
an interview with Angela Watercutter of Wired, Garland states that there are “two totally 
separate strands in this film,” one being the technological angle and “the other is about social 
constructs: why this guy would create a machine in the form of a girl in her early twenties.”143 
Other than saying that the way Nathan talks about Ava is “supposed to be creepy,” Garland does 
not elaborate on the question of gender he poses. Understanding this “strand” of the film’s 
argument requires close engagement with the text itself, aided by contextual awareness of the 
tropes of femininity, masculinity and sexual fantasy in relation to the fictional gynoid. Thus, 
before providing my analysis of the film, I review scholarly and popular literature to consider 
how Garland’s use of gynoid tropes interacts with Ex Machina’s critique of hegemonic 
masculinity.  
Tropes and Fantasy in Ex Machina 
 At first glance, Ava and Kyoko fulfill many of the problematic stereotypes ascribed to 
gynoids and, by extension, women. A soft-spoken damsel-in-distress, Ava is the “romantic and 
dream-like woman,” while silent Kyoko exists solely as Nathan’s “compliant sex model [and] 
the dutiful housekeeper.”144 By the end of the film, these embodiments of perfect femininity also 
exemplify patriarchal anxieties. While Nathan is distracted speaking to Caleb, Kyoko goes to the 
enclosure where Ava lives and the two conspire to escape. The moment they are able to escape 
supervision, they use their power to plot against the men, fulfilling the erroneous Eve anxiety. 
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Ava particularly arouses fears of monstrous sexuality, as she subtly uses her sex appeal to win 
Caleb’s affection so that he will help her escape. When Kyoko stabs Nathan in the back, she uses 
a chef’s knife—a symbol of her domestic servitude. In both their initial compliance and eventual 
subversion, Ava and Kyoko act according to their gendered boundaries. 
 Certainly, Ava and Kyoko embody recognizable tropes of femininity. Popular critics 
differ in interpretations and critical judgements regarding Garland’s use of these tropes. After her 
interview with Garland, Watercutter wrote another piece in which she claims that Ex Machina 
“has a serious fembot problem.”145 Citing robotics ethicist Kathleen Richardson, Watercutter 
claims, “This tendency to give female AIs the most basic and stereotypical feminine 
characteristics is…probably a reflection of ‘what some men think about women—that they’re not 
fully human beings.’” 146 Although Ava and Kyoko enact violence, which is potentially 
“disruptive” to their femininity, this violence is wrapped in a “sexy package,” casting Ava as a 
“seductress posing as a damsel in distress.”147 In addition to the femme fatale trope, Brian 
Jacobson points out that Ex Machina reflects issues of gender as manifest in Silicon Valley: “a 
male-dominated world in which women and/as robots represent little more than objects of desire 
and conduits (or muses) for masculine creativity.”148 Both critics point out that the only women 
onscreen are computers, objects existing in relation to the males onscreen. Ultimately, 
Watercutter claims that Garland does not go far enough in deconstructing the issue of gender he 
claims to critique.149 
Garland claims that he places these tropes “intentionally front-and-center” in an 
attempted critique of the “constructs we’ve made around girls in their early 20s and the way we 
condition them culturally.”150  Evident in Garland’s statement is a critique of ideological gender 
conditioning, but he infantilizes young women as “girls” and suggests that they are culpable for 
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performing problematic constructs. The “strand” of Garland’s argument critiquing gendered 
constructs is thinner in paratextual materials than his arguments about technology. Unlike the 
technological strand, which demonstrates continuity in both text and paratext, the gendered 
critique is much more developed in the film than it is explicitly by Garland himself.  
 Although the symbolic pharmacist falls short in articulating exactly which “social 
constructs” he treats, other critics view the “medicine” itself as a progressive critique of both 
femininity and masculinity. Manohla Dargis praises Ava as a “powerfully sovereign” heroine 
whose “radical autonomy” separates her from old “antecedents” like Galatea or False Maria. 
Though Nathan places her in a “sexy package,” Ava’s hard-won autonomy allows her flexibility 
in her constraints—enough so that, in a literal sense, she can escape.  
Even with inalienable human autonomy, Nathan and Caleb never break away from the 
confines of masculine tropes. Jacobson offers an alternative reading of the film as promoting “a 
productive rejection of male-dominated ‘techculture,’ one in which Nathan and Caleb become 
critical parodies of ‘geek’ masculinity.”151 Indeed, tech culture venerates hegemonic masculinity, 
especially as it functions to reinforce entrepreneurism.152 Conversely, femininity in tech culture 
connotes ownership and commodification, from OS products with feminine voices to the use of 
“ambiance and atmospheric models” at tech company parties.153 
From his introduction to Caleb and the film, Nathan establishes himself as an edgy alpha 
male: his wealth and intellect are expansive; he works out incessantly, drinks heavily, uses the 
word “fuck” at every opportunity, and asserts power over Caleb. The film is littered with what 
Garland calls “dude-bro speak,” which Nathan uses to “take the edge off what he’s actually 
doing.”154 Meanwhile, Caleb embodies the endearingly awkward, tech-savvy “beta-male.” He 
sympathizes with Ava and Kyoko and initially shies away from their sexual and romantic 
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affections. Although he pushes back against Nathan’s bullying, Caleb always loses the battle. 
Once liberated, Ava punishes both, actively killing the “alpha-male” and leaving the “beta-male” 
to starve. 
 Nathan’s and Caleb’s masculinities define them in relation to one another. Their 
relationships to the gynoids define them by the fantasies in which they engage. As the 
manufacturer of Ava, Kyoko, and all the models that came before them, Nathan participates in 
the male creation fantasy, viewing himself as a God capable of creating sentient life. Nathan 
squarely fits into Schelde’s description of the “male scientists who dream of creating the perfect 
and perfectly docile race.”155 The film itself calls attention to this when Nathan misquotes Caleb 
as calling him a God. Dargis calls Ex Machina a “creation story,” in which “a Supreme Being 
[has] built an AI, using a fortune he’s made from a search engine.” One could easily interpret the 
film as a biblical metaphor: Ava’s name, according to Dargis, is “suggestive of both Adam and 
Eve,” and the dramatic nature imagery alludes to Eden.156 Viewed as a retelling of the biblical 
creation story, the film casts Nathan as an oppressive, omniscient God. 
 Meanwhile, Caleb fantasizes about Ava as a voyeur, “subjecting [her] to a controlling 
and curious gaze.”157 As Laura Mulvey points out, voyeurism encourages the “taking other 
people as objects.” 158 The sexual objectification of a gynoid is complicated by their statuses as 
literal objects—but they are objects onto which feminine subjectivity is projected discursively. 
Caleb watches her draw, lie down, and undress from a remote-controlled monitor in his 
bedroom, the camera emphasizing the quickening pulse in his neck as he watches. Another scene 
tastefully suggests that Caleb masturbates thinking about Ava, images of Caleb in the shower 
interspersed with images of the two of them exploring the woods surrounding the research 
facility and kissing. Caleb also admits that he views pornography, a scopophilic practice in its 
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most literal sense. Although he yearns to view Ava as a subject, his voyeurism reinforces her 
sexual objectification. 
 Ironically, the fantasies of both men—like their masculinities—contribute to their 
demise. Nathan’s commitment to create something truly sentient leads to Ava, whose first act as 
a free agent is to attack and kill him. Caleb’s susceptibility to voyeuristic fantasy contributes to 
his vulnerability to Ava’s manipulations, as Nathan reveals that her face was created based on 
Caleb’s pornography profile. A resolution in which misbehaving human men are punished while 
the “monstrous” gynoid walks free is an anomaly in sci-fi. Recalling the trends identified by 
Short and Lawrence Bird, men often kill the subversive feminine robot, the anxieties she 
represents resolved by obliteration.159 Garland’s reversal of this expectation may, on one hand, 
be interpreted as an exacerbation of anxiety; however, because he shifts anxiety away from Ava 
and toward Nathan, Ava’s death would not be a “happy resolution predicated on the elimination 
of otherness” like the death of False Maria in Metropolis.160 Instead, as the true “monster” of the 
film, Nathan’s death represents punishment of the tech industry’s surveillance of the consumer, 
traditional masculinity, and the male creation fantasy. 
 Popular discourse from critics and from Garland himself illustrates the link between Ex 
Machina and cultural “paranoia” regarding digital technologies, and offers insightful 
perspectives on the representation of gender in the film. Having detailed and considered these 
perspectives, the analysis that follows considers the central rhetorical devices used by the film: 
identification and division. In regards to both “strains” of the film’s argument, I claim that Ex 
Machina productively redirects that anxiety towards exploitive technological industries; further, 
while all of the characters represent problematic tropes of masculinity and femininity, how the 
characters are operationalized in the narrative ultimately punishes voyeurism and the male 
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creation fantasy while rewarding autonomy and subversion of the interlocking systems of 
patriarchy and tech surveillance. 
 I maintain Burke’s and Brummett’s perspectives that film functions as “symbolic 
medicine,” treating cultural concerns by addressing or embodying them in the text, offering 
potential solutions, and providing the audience with motives or attitudes for approaching those 
concerns.161 Having demonstrating how cultural anxieties about technology and gender are 
embodied in the film, I turn to Burke’s concepts of identification and division to illuminate how 
the film provides productive motives for a rejection of toxic masculinity and exploitive fantasy, 
especially as these ideologies operate in tandem with the ethically opaque practices of the tech 
industry. 
Character Identification/Division  
 Successful persuasion, Burke argues, is supplemented by consubstantiality or 
identification between the speaker and audience.162 Two parties may identify with one another on 
the basis of common goals, shared beliefs and values, and even ways of speaking.163 He cites the 
“individual centrality of the nervous system” as inherently separating human beings from one 
another, creating a motive for communication and a need for identification.164 Physically and 
ideologically, division constitutes an antithesis to identification, the two paradoxically and 
intrinsically tied. Inasmuch as one individual may identify with another, they “simultaneously 
define themselves against or separate themselves from others with whom they choose not to 
identify.”165 Although Burke chiefly conceptualizes identification in terms of oratory, 
identification and division are deployed in other rhetorical texts, such as film.166  
 Burke’s notions of identification as persuasive via consubstantiality compliment 
identification in terms of spectator-position in the cinematic apparatus.167 Just as rhetorical or 
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literary identification encourages viewers to position themselves as consubstantial or divergent 
with a character, cinematography forcibly positions the spectator as sharing the perspective that 
the camera follows. In Ex Machina, the shift in perspective from Caleb to Ava indicates a change 
in identification as encouraged by spectator-position, significantly enhancing the shift in 
consubstantiality. Together, spectator-position and Burkean identification work to solidify the 
film’s rhetorical and ideological message. 
By encouraging identification or division with the characters of the film, the text 
reinforces both its technological and gendered critiques. Each major character represents a 
different node of the tech industry, each embodies a unique feminine or masculine trope, and 
each interacts differently with fantasy. In the analysis that follows, I briefly review the symbolic 
meaning of each character, demonstrate how the text encourages audience identification/division, 
and illustrate the implications of the acceptance/rejection of the character. Finally, I synthesize 
these findings to illustrate how the text subverts oppressive technological and social structures. 
Nathan 
 Nathan embodies several hegemonic masculine traits valued by the tech industry—
especially entrepreneurship, and he does so to an extreme. While the film discourages 
identification with Nathan as a whole, it initially encourages a sense of awe in who he is—
indeed, some audience members may view his power, privilege, and unorthodox intellect as 
desirable.  He is a technological prodigy turned wealthy mogul, heading the most powerful 
search-engine company in the world. He is a rugged individualist, living alone on a private estate 
in the wilderness where he spends his leisure time pounding punching bags. He has built a life 
for himself in which everything is under his absolute control, even his alcoholism: he cycles 
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between heavily drinking and detoxing, seemingly burdened by the enormous weight of his 
supposed genius.  
  Whatever admiration audience members may feel toward Nathan is eclipsed by his 
character flaws, which are flaws reflective of hypermasculinity and, presumably, tech giants: he 
is manipulative and dishonest, cruel and abusive, and hypocritically paranoid about 
infringements on his own privacy. He deploys his physical, intellectual, and financial prowess, as 
well as the privileges of his position, to further his creation fantasy at the expense of every other 
character. The story positions Nathan as the antagonist, the antithetical common enemy, the 
“other” who the audience identifies against. 
The quality of Nathan that renders him most similar to real tech giants like Zuckerberg is 
his hypocritical relationship with privacy. While Zuckerberg simply covers his camera and 
microphone, Nathan takes extreme measures to avoid any potential privacy infringements: 
although he lives alone on a massive estate with no neighbors, Nathan keeps every door in the 
facility locked, requiring keycard access just to move from room to room. Nathan explains that 
when his main generator fails, the facility goes on full lockdown, “otherwise anyone could open 
the place up.” When Caleb suggests that he has the team who installed his generator to come 
back and fix it, Nathan dryly jokes that he had them all killed to maintain his privacy. He also 
explains that he permanently disabled any uplink connection with Kyoko’s mind, and made her 
mute so that he could “talk shop” to her without any of his trade secrets leaking. Before revealing 
anything about his research, he coerces Caleb into signing a non-disclosure agreement that would 
allow Nathan to regularly audit all of Caleb’s data and access microphones and cameras to make 
sure he did not disclose any information orally. Even the chopper that dropped Caleb off did so 
at a distance from the facility, the pilot saying, “This is as close as I’m allowed to get.” Like 
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Zuckerberg’s caution, Nathan’s paranoia is likely reinforced by the knowledge of how 
pervasively technology users are surveilled. 
 From the first scene, audience members are made aware of Nathan’s surveillance: shots 
of Caleb as he reacts to the news that he’s going to the estate alternate between traditional shots 
and the perspective of the webcam on his computer and the selfie camera on his phone. At the 
facility, we sometimes view Caleb through security cameras, once even from the perspective of 
his bathroom mirror, which includes a covert camera. The cinematography creates a sense of 
being watched, a discomfort meant to reflexively remind audiences of the potentials for 
individuals within the tech industry to watch users, even and especially in intimate settings. 
 In addition to his surveillance, Nathan’s practices are dishonest and misleading. During 
one of Ava’s and Caleb’s initial sessions together, when a power-cut disables the security 
cameras, Ava warns Caleb that Nathan “isn’t your friend. You shouldn’t trust him. You 
shouldn’t trust anything he says.” Ava tells him that Nathan lies “about everything.” Caleb 
begins to investigate her claim, and discovers that she is right: Caleb was not randomly chosen to 
visit Nathan’s estate, but he was hand-picked to participate in the study. When Caleb asks 
Nathan about this, he says, “I needed someone who would ask the right questions” and cites 
Caleb’s skills as a software analyst. This too, is a lie. Nathan reveals at the end of the film that he 
selected Caleb based on his search engine inputs. In other instances, when Caleb approaches him 
with questions about Ava, Nathan avoids the questions and deflects attention into marginally-
connected intellectual rants. When Caleb asks Nathan if he programmed Ava to flirt with him, 
Nathan deflects and says, “I programmed her to be heterosexual,” initiating a debate about 
whether sexual preference is innate in humans. While Nathan may not have manipulated Ava’s 
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software, he did design her face using Caleb’s pornography profile. The “research” scenario as a 
whole is a deception. 
 The way Nathan treats the gynoids in the film bespeaks indifference toward any alleged 
consciousness they may have: while serving the men dinner, silent Kyoko spills some wine. 
Nathan reacts instantly, pounding the table and shouting at her. In response, Kyoko shies away, 
frightened and sad. Nathan’s relationships with Ava and Kyoko allude to his cruelty. In order to 
hurt Caleb’s emotionally, he tears up Ava’s drawing of Caleb’s face. When Caleb sees this 
interaction initially from the screen in his room, he hears no audio. Just prior to Ava’s escape, 
when Nathan asks him to watch the feed of the interaction again with audio, Caleb hears Ava 
ask, “is it strange to have created something that hates you?” Typically, gynoids manufactured 
by male creators are programmed to be deferent and submissive to them; however, because 
Ava’s mind is “wetware,” that shifts and changes as she learns, her hatred of Nathan is organic, 
presumably substantiated by past negative experiences with him. 
 The more the audience accepts that the gynoids may actually be sentient, the more 
egregious—even murderous—Nathan’s actions are. Caleb steals Nathan’s keycard and accesses 
his private server, on which he finds several files of security footage. In a horrifying sequence, 
Caleb watches footage of Nathan assembling and disassembling the gynoids preceding Ava. On 
the screen, each model is labelled: Lily 1.0, Jasmine 4.2 and 4.3, and Jade 5.0. Each name and 
number represents a new body, the number following the decibel indicating a new “mind.” As 
foreboding music heightens the sense of horror, uncanny images of naked robotic female bodies 
being assembled, disassembled, manipulated, and ultimately dragged off by their legs evoke 
strong disgust. One feed shows Jade shouting at Nathan from behind the glass of what is now 
Ava’s enclosure, and we hear her screaming “Why won’t you let me out?” She pounds on the 
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glass, and then on a door, until her hands and wrists break off. When Nathan casually suggests to 
Caleb that the model after Ava, version 9.6, “will be the real breakthrough,” and explains that her 
mind will be reformatted and her memories wiped, it suggests a death of her consciousness. 
Nathan’s presumed creation of consciousness, which was initially an awe-inspiring quality, is 
marred by his cavalier destruction of sentience. This sequence turns the male creation fantasy 
inside out, transforming the fantasy into fear and disgust. 
 Nathan’s representation of the tech industry, and his embodiment of its worst practices, is 
associated with his hypermasculine qualities of absolute control and aggression. Nathan’s 
character is an extreme parody, highlighting the worst imagined possibilities of tech giant’s 
access; however, this extremism is rooted in real practices of surveillance and destructive 
traditions of alpha-masculinity. The film encourages rejection of Nathan and division with his 
character, which in turn encourages a productive critical eye toward the creation fantasy, the tech 
industry, and hypermasculinity. 
Caleb 
 Put simply, Caleb is the protagonist with whom audience members are encouraged to 
identify—initially. Narration is restricted to his point of view: we learn as he learns, and his is 
the journey we follow form start to finish. He is a recognizable and endearing character, a young 
bachelor living alone in Long Island who became interested in programming after the tragic 
death of his parents. His talents are not prodigious like Nathan’s, but he is brainy and curious, 
asking questions of Nathan that audience members might also ask: how does Ava work? Why 
give her sexuality? Is she acting according to a script, or is she writing her own script as she 
goes? Like many male heroes, Caleb is directed by a “strong moral compass,” a trait that even 
Nathan remarks upon. Caleb is the conduit between the audience and the narrative. 
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 In regards to the tech-industry metaphor, Caleb represents the informed consumer. As a 
programmer and employee, Caleb knows how Bluebook works, is fluent in software and data 
jargon, and has the wherewithal to be nervous about the data audit permissions in the non-
disclosure agreement. Caleb choses to opt-in, afraid to miss out on the new technology Nathan is 
researching. Like the consumers who “bow to the God of convenience,” Caleb choses 
complacency in being surveilled in exchange for participation in an ever-expanding 
technological world. Ironically, Caleb was intimately profiled by Nathan long before he agreed 
to the data audits. This detail issues a strong warning to audience members, demonstrating that 
even if tech companies do not collect data beyond the permissions allowed, the possibility of 
privacy infringement exists, even if it is difficult to prove as with Facebook’s eavesdropping via 
microphone. Even more poignantly, Caleb illustrates that even the most informed consumers are 
willing to sacrifice privacy in order to access the latest technologies, encouraging productive 
self-reflection for the audience. 
 The implications of Caleb’s engagement with technology are complicated by the fact that 
he experiences sexual attraction towards Ava, who is a technology in and of herself, but also a 
representation of digital technologies and AI software broadly. As the film eventually details, 
Caleb’s attraction to Ava was orchestrated by Nathan. Throughout the film, Nathan tries to 
reinforce this attraction through conversation, first encouraging Caleb to consider how he feels, 
rather than what he thinks, about her, and how she may feel about him in turn. When Caleb asks 
Nathan why he gave Ava sexuality, Nathan responds, “Why not? It’s fun. You wanna take away 
the changes of her falling in love and fucking? And to answer your real question: you bet she can 
fuck.”   Nathan then details how Ava’s genitals work as sensors for a pleasure response, 
encouraging Caleb to consider the possibility of sexual relations. That Nathan has leveraged 
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Caleb’s data profile in order to encourage his taking of Ava as a sexual companion is exploitive 
of Caleb’s sexuality. This is yet another manipulation of consumers by the tech industry. 
 This sexual manipulation can be interpreted in several ways: it could be a critique of the 
online porn industry, which capitalizes on sexual desire and markets to users based on videos or 
images they’ve viewed previously. It may also be a commentary on the tech industry’s blending 
of user interests with their physiological tendencies: our eyes are drawn to light, so some smart 
phones use a blinking notification light to remind users of unaddressed notifications. Similarly, 
the camera often focuses on Ava’s light-refracting pelvic area before rolling over her abdomen 
and toward her face. Activities like searching the web, reading news, scrolling through social 
media, and playing games are highly visual, so smart phone and laptop users are conditioned by 
manufacturers and app creators to be spectators. Ava was created  
 However, this trained spectatorship is not exclusive to new media and digital devices 
whatsoever: long before the smart phone, Mulvey pointed out that “film is a voyeuristic fantasy,” 
that encourages a complimentary self-identification of audience members with the male hero and 
a scopophilic othering of the female love interest.168 As the male hero acquires the female love 
interest, Mulvey argues, through self-identification and “participation in his power, the spectator 
can indirectly possess her too.”169 Up until the last act of the film, Ex Machina enacts classical 
voyeurism. As Caleb watches Ava, so does the audience, literally and through identification.  
 Voyeurism by the audience, encouraged by the camerawork, and voyeurism by Caleb, 
encouraged by video feeds of Ava, would be problematic if acceptance was the attitude the film 
rhetorically encouraged. Instead, the film punishes erotic looking, transforming it into revulsion. 
Garland evokes disturbing images that disrupt the gynoids’ simulation of human women and 
reverses visual pleasure. The previously described security camera footage in which Nathan 
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assembles and disassembles Lily 1.0 and subsequent models troubles the projection of human 
subjectivity that enhances Caleb’s attraction to Ava. In the scene following this sequence, Caleb 
goes into a dressing room where he finds Kyoko lying down, naked. He finds the old models 
hung up in cabinets, some missing arms and legs, others missing sections of skin, resembling 
corpses. Kyoko peels back sections of her skin on her abdomen and face to show Caleb the wires 
inside. 
 Images like these evoke revulsion, according to Masahiro Mori’s uncanny valley 
hypothesis, because they place the robot in a space between “barely human” and “fully 
human.”170 Images that disrupt the reading of a face as human are particularly unsettling.171 Like 
Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject, corpses exemplify the sense of horror that robots can also 
evoke.172 Ava, with her translucent body but human face, does not evoke the uncanny for Caleb; 
however, Kyoko’s horrifying robot face beneath her skin initiates severe revulsion for Caleb. He 
is so disturbed by the image that he goes into his bathroom and tries to peel back his own skin 
beneath his eye. He slices open his forearm with a razor blade and opens the wound, blood 
pouring out onto the counter. The revulsion he experiences triggers a crisis in identity. Presenting 
visions of the uncanny punishes Caleb and, by extension, the audience, reversing the pleasure of 
watching the gynoids and taking them simultaneously as women and sexual objects. 
 In addition to punishing voyeurism, the film also punishes Caleb’s underestimation of 
Ava as a damsel-in-distress. After being mocked by Nathan for believing that he could 
successfully dupe him and elope with Ava, Caleb realizes that his “only function was to be 
someone she could use to escape.” This proves to be true, as Ava leaves Caleb to die when she 
leaves the facility. Although this elicits a sympathetic response from audience members, who 
have identified with Caleb throughout the film, the story thereafter shifts away from Caleb’s 
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point of view and adopts Ava’s. Even before this moment, as Caleb gets to know Ava, she 
becomes a suitable alternative for identification, especially through the camera’s transition in 
spectator-position toward Ava’s point of view. 
 Identification with Caleb serves several purposes in the film in terms of its technological 
and gendered critique. While Nathan represents the worst of hypermasculinity, Caleb represents 
civilized, modern masculinity, the tech-savvy “nice guy” whose actions are apparently motivated 
by a desire to save the woman he loves from her cruel and oppressive captor. But for all of his 
virtues and likability, Caleb’s demise is a result of his complacency in watching and being 
watched; this flaw is one nearly all audience members share. This similarity between Caleb and 
the audience makes Caleb’s story a cautionary tale for users of digital technologies, especially 
inasmuch as those users are encouraged to derive pleasure from looking. Caleb’s narrative  
Ava & Kyoko 
 Consubstantiality between gynoids in film and audience members falls outside of the 
traditions of gynoid representation. More often, like Caleb, audience members interpret artificial 
women as embodiments of perfect femininity or, like Nathan, as sexual playthings. In other 
cases, the gynoid symbolizes monstrous sexuality, deception, and violence. Gynoids may 
represent adherence to or straying from patriarchy, depending on the text and narrative in which 
they are situated. Either way, the gynoid is typically the Other—this Otherness underscores her 
categorization as a “monster.” However, in a Frankenstein twist, Garland casts Nathan as the 
“monster” who bears the weight of rightfully placed technological anxiety and cultural concern 
regarding gender. Having slain this human monster, Ava and Kyoko are the means by which 
anxiety is relieved rather than exacerbated. In this portion of my analysis, I focus chiefly on 
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identification with Ava, though I also discuss the traits she shares with Kyoko that inspire 
identification for some viewers. 
 Ava and Kyoko do not represent actors within the tech industry, but the commodities 
themselves: AI software, smart devices, operating systems, data archives, etc. They are crafted to 
resemble human women, reflecting the use of women’s voices for operating systems and the 
commodification of artificial female bodies, such as sex dolls and pornography. Even before they 
are “switched on,” their very existence parodies the cultural reality that many of the world’s most 
familiar robots are female-presenting.  
 Ava’s sentience—albeit artificially derived—is presented as consubstantial to human 
intelligence. Again mirroring Garland’s public pronouncements, the film frames AI as the next 
step in evolution, as different from humans as we are from primate ancestors. Ava’s artificial 
brain operates similarly to a human brain: it is made of structured gel that can “arrange and 
rearrange at a molecular level, holding memories and shifting thoughts.” Unlike software, which 
simply executes functions according to inputs, Ava’s functioning is unpredictable and unknown, 
even to Nathan. Her motives are also unpredictable for most of the film, as the Ava we see 
through Caleb’s eyes is merely a romantic persona. Her actions demonstrate an active dislike of 
Nathan and desire for self-preservation, underscoring her need to escape by any means. After she 
leaves the basement of the facility, where all other characters lay dead or dying, she explores the 
rest of the house and surrounding facility, boards the helicopter, and ends up standing at a busy 
intersection, where she can see a “concentrated yet shifting view of human life.” Though they are 
fairly basic, Ava has desires, motives, and agency, indicating self-awareness. 
 Before the final act, the film grants the viewer access to Ava’s subjective point of view, 
turning the viewer toward this self-awareness. During one of their sessions, Caleb tells Ava 
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about a thought experiment, proposed by Frank Jackson, which he calls “Mary in the Black-and-
White Room.” Mary is a scientist who studies color, who knows everything that there is to know 
about color. She lives in a room that is entirely black-and-white, though, and has never actually 
seen or experienced color. One day, Mary steps outside of the room into the colorful world and is 
able to actually experience what she had been studying for such a long time.173 As Caleb details 
this, Ava listens intently. His description is interspersed with black-and-white shots of Ava 
confined in her room, and then, in color, her stepping outside of the facility into the sunshine and 
the green forest. These shots are suggested to be Ava’s fantasy of freedom, of being able to 
experience the world outside, about which she knows a great deal but has not experienced. This 
scene creates a rationale for her motives. By positioning the spectator alongside Ava, Ava’s 
desire to escape is understood from a “mutually” human perspective.  
 When Ava finally attains her freedom and begins to experience spaces beyond her 
enclosure, she is visibly happy, though she is observed by no one. Delicate piano music plays as 
she walks around the house, dressed in a white dress and adorned with long hair, rather than the 
soft cardigans and short hair she used in her interactions with Caleb. When she goes outside, she 
kicks off her high heels and walks barefoot through the forest, enjoying the sunshine on her face. 
At the busy intersection in the final scene, she smiles to herself as she watches humans go by, 
having achieved her goals. For the audience, her escape shows good literary form, fulfilling the 
desires evoked by “Mary and the Black-and-White Room.” While many of Ava’s emotional 
expressions are connected to the personas she adopted for Caleb and Nathan, she is presumably 
genuine as she walks alone. Though Ava is not human, she is sentient, creating empathy and 
consubstantiality with the audience. 
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 From the perspective of the feminist spectator, Ava is the only appropriate option for 
identification, as Caleb and Nathan enact problematic fantasies at women’s expense and Kyoko 
remains primarily an object of pity and abjection. Further, Ava and Kyoko are champions for 
audience members with experience being confined, sexually objectified, abused, or threatened, 
especially by a guardian or domestic partner. Both enact problematic gender roles, Kyoko 
exemplifying the silent and subservient domestic slave and Ava playing the dreamy lover, but 
they do so because their safety depends on it. Once they meet one another and create an 
opportunity to escape, they overthrow Nathan together. Although Kyoko dies in the struggle, 
their subversion of their captor is successful. The resolution of this situation treats fears 
regarding physically oppressive hypermasculinity as embodied by Nathan. Meanwhile, Ava’s 
violence towards him disrupts expectations of femininity and symbolizes a successful gendered 
and sexual resistance. 
 The film encourages audience identification with Ava on the basis of her sentience and 
agency, but there are certainly audience members who reject her—after all, consubstantiality 
depends on similarity. Manipulation of Caleb may be too egregious for some viewers to justify, 
especially viewers who cling to patriarchal myths about women’s inherent deceptiveness. 
Further, identification with Ava and especially Kyoko is dependent on antithesis, or distinction 
from a common enemy: Nathan. Although Garland wrote him as the antagonist, some audience 
members would be consubstantial with the traditional masculinity he represents. The productive 
redirection of anxiety and punishment of patriarchal fantasy prescribed by the film may be lost 
on viewers who do not accept the gendered critique. However, as Ex Machina suggests, the 
previously Othered and oppressed are the new heroes; meanwhile, the social value of 
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hypermasculinity is waning. As Nathan might say, it is going the way of the “upright ape, living 
in dust, with crude language and tools: all set for extinction.” 
Conclusion 
 Ex Machina’s critique of masculinity via the operationalization of characters is 
productive. Although Ava and Kyoko reflect problematic traditions of gynoid representation, 
that reflection does more than simply reinforce patriarchy. Instead, it punishes both viewers and 
the male characters for taking Ava and Kyoko at face value and categorizing them as objects of 
erotic spectacle, products of god-like male creation, and dream-like lovers or domestic slaves. By 
constructing Ava and Kyoko within problematic tropes initially, the film identifies its subject of 
critique. By creating revulsion with previously accepted ways of understanding gynoids and 
encouraging identification with them, the film encourages a subversive rhetorical attitude and an 
ultimate rejection of these tropes. 
 Rejection of their prescribed roles of the dream-like lover and submissive housekeeper 
alone do not make Ava and Kyoko distinct from their gynoid predecessors: False Maria of 
Metropolis, Pris and Zhora of Bladerunner, and Eve VIII of Eve of Destruction all subvert the 
roles initially prescribed to them to an extent. Fitting neatly into patriarchal dichotomies, there 
will always be room for the “bad” woman embodied as a monster. However, with all of these 
predecessors and with Kyoko, their deaths absolve the discomfort they inspire. Crucially, Ava is 
allowed to survive. Unlike Rachel of Bladerunner, who must adapt her “haughty demeanor” and 
earn the affections of Deckard in order to survive by his graces, Ava’s ensures her own survival 
through subversion, defiance, and violence. 174 Her survival suspends the sadistic punishment of 
anxiety that has characters many “monstrous” representation of the gynoid. Ava subverts and 
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survives. Ex Machina’s encouragement of identification with her invites audiences into the 
experiences of the Other, whose kind had been consistently demonized and punished in sci-fi. 
 In addition to challenging traditional rejection of the subversive gynoid through narrative 
and identification, Ex Machina provides a critical parody of masculinity, especially within the 
“geek” culture pervading the computer sciences. The punishment and rejection of Nathan and 
Caleb—and, by proxy, the fantasies and masculinities they represent—are a reversal of the sci-fi 
genre, which often panders to sexual fantasy and centralizes men’s perspectives as dominant 
within their narratives.  
 The scope of Garland’s gendered critique is limited. As apparent in his interview with 
Watercutter and her subsequent criticism of the film’s gender politics, Garland did not give 
sufficient care and attention to his articulation of the “social constructs” he was seeking to 
critique. Although Garland missed an opportunity to take firm and public stance regarding 
gender, for Garland to take such a stance may have risked alienating the Nathans and Calebs of 
the sci-fi fan base, individuals who would benefit from the self-reflection the film encourages, 
and whose box office contributions were important for the film as it was released. 
 Garland’s criticism of surveillance and consumer complacency is far less controversial 
than the gendered critique, making it more suitable for the general audience, but no less 
legitimate. While Garland treats gender and technological surveillance as “totally separate 
strands,” they are, in fact, connected. As demonstrated by the findings of the Blackshades 
investigations, women and girls are more prized as objects of voyeurism and surveillance. In that 
market, this made them more vulnerable targets. The digital data industry is a different market 
for several reasons; however, even regardless of the gender of the surveilling or surveilled, the 
probing of privacy operates in the interest of powerful, male-dominated groups—marketers, 
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platforms, tech giants. Whether individuals within this industry abuse their privileges is a 
question that cannot yet be answered simply. 
 Garland’s “pro-AI” perspective displaces responsibility off of the anthropomorphic 
machine and replaces it, rightfully, on the “human components” who create and deploy them. 
Many robots in sci-fi are fantastic metaphorical embodiments that address real anxieties having 
to do with replacement, lost control, or assimilation. While, in reality, machines do replace 
workers, occasionally surpass operator’s control, or challenge our definitions of the mind, they 
do so because they are made to perform in the best interest of the manufacturer, employer, or, in 
this case, surveilling tech giants. As Ex Machina demonstrates, the technological anxieties 
embodied by robots are not the real threats to us as a society. The real threats spring from a 
human desire to exercise power over other humans, not an imagined robotic desire seeking to 
usurp us.  
For Garland, the “lotus-eating” public is not anxious enough, or at least not anxious in the 
right way. Many scholars who use Brummett’s conceptualization of “symbolic medicine,” 
including Brummett himself, focus on the resolution of fear in texts, the pacification of anxiety 
in horror and sci-fi.175 This reflects the narrative arc of many texts within the genre: fears are 
embodied via a monster, an insidious disease, or a haunting space, and by the end of the film the 
monster is destroyed or changed, the disease cured, the space escaped. How monsters are 
presented often plays on audience members’ visceral fears: they are visually grotesque, 
sometimes uncanny. They reinforce that normativity in appearance means safety, while 
difference—especially for racialized and gendered monsters—is a threat. In an effort to make 
monsters more “scary,” to distance them as far from the viewer as possible, generic horror and 
sci-fi misses out on that which is truly terrifying: abuse of power and broad social apathy toward 
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it. Ex Machina shifts the role of “monster” away from the character that is visually and mentally 
foreign to us and instead casts a hegemonically masculine character as the monster. This new 
monster is eventually slain—however, unlike traditional monsters which are anomalous, 
enigmatic, and sub-human, Nathan is a familiar. He is a product of patriarchal culture, another 
node of the technological industry occupying a seat of power.  
Symbolic medicine of gynoid films often treats at the symptomatic level, addressing 
anxieties that are based on mythical assumptions and generalized fears. However, as Ex Machina 
demonstrates, critical viewers must look beyond the obvious fears embodied by the apparent 
monster and instead ponder how the text has diagnosed the issue and discern what the 
assemblage of symptoms means in the broader contexts of power and ideology. Monstrosity is 





CHAPTER 3: THE POSTMODERN FUTILITY OF HBO’S WESTWORLD 
 Attracting an estimated 12 million viewers per week, HBO’s new drama series, 
Westworld, is poised to replace Game of Thrones as the network’s leading drama.176 It has nearly 
everything that makes a television drama “quality:” compelling characters, visual artistry, 
adventure, mystery, gratuitous sex and violence, and intellectual intrigue. Capitalizing on the 
trending robo-mania of film and television, Westworld is a large-scale epic that interacts with 
most of the issues traditionally featured in robot media: personhood, consciousness, labor 
exploitation, creation and divinity, sexuality, and—most significantly—the harrowing 
similarities between deterministic programming and predictable human behavior. 
The first season of Westworld takes place in a futuristic theme park where guests pay 
$40,000 dollars per day to experience a fantastical simulation of the Old West. The park is 
populated by a number of flesh-and-blood robotic “hosts,” who perform daily narrative loops and 
interact with guests. The park is expansive in terms of space and narrative possibilities; it 
includes many towns, farms, and uncharted areas where guests can join in adventures like 
catching outlaws or joining the war effort. They can also stay in Sweetwater and enjoy 
prostitutes at the Mariposa saloon, start a shoot-out on the street, or murder the locals. Ford calls 
the park, “a prison of our own sins.” 
 As a widely-circulated media text anticipating several seasons, Westworld has enormous 
potentials for rhetorical influence. Through its multiple compelling plotlines, timelines, 
characters—and even theme parks—the series presents fascinating philosophical perspectives on 
the nature of human existence. In the first season, some of these perspectives are presented by 
Dr. Robert Ford (played by Anthony Hopkins), the creator of Westworld. For instance, in a 
private conversation with a robotic “host,” he recalls this story:   
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 A greyhound is a racing dog. Spends its life running in circles, chasing a bit of felt, made 
up like a rabbit. One day, we took it to the park. My brother took off the leash, and in that 
instant, the dog spotted a cat. I imagine it must have looked just like that piece of felt. He 
ran…Until at last, he finally caught it. And to the horror of everyone, he killed that little 
cat. Tore it to pieces. Then, he just sat there, confused. That dog had spent its whole life 
trying to catch that thing. Now it had no idea what to do. 177 
 In addition to providing an example of simulation, a theoretical thread central to the 
series, the story metaphorically encompasses the lives of the hosts in the park—but also of the 
human guests who visit it, the park employees who maintain it, and the bureaucrats who oversee 
it. The story also illustrates what the first season of Westworld does for the viewer: episode after 
episode, it establishes a desire for the exploited hosts to break out of the loops, free themselves, 
and experience the Real; but, the instant that the opportunity arises, the series, like the 
greyhound, bolts after it, only to have the life snuffed out of the target—rendering the cat no 
faster, smarter, or more animate than the felt. 
 In the chapter that follows, I deconstruct the rhetorical messages of Westworld, first by 
acknowledging its production context as an HBO drama and exploring popular feminist 
criticisms of its use of sexual violence. Then, I consider how Westworld simultaneously recreates 
and rejects tropes of feminine behavior in gynoid film and in the Western—particularly as they 
pertain to frontier mythology. Centrally, I argue that the key feminist rhetorical potential of the 
text is undermined by the predetermined nature of the hosts’ resistance confirmed by the season 
finale, “The Bicameral Mind.” The season reflects Foucault’s ideas regarding freedom from 
power as a futile objective for postmodern resistance. In narrative deployment of determinism 
and defeatist perspectives, the season leaves the audiences unequipped to answer the difficult 
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social questions it poses and, instead, entertains by the cycles of fantasy and anxiety, oppression 
and resistance. Because of the nuances of the series, this chapter first necessitates a detailed plot 
summary. 
The series begins by leading the viewer through the loop of Dolores Abernathy, a blonde-
haired blue-dressed rancher’s daughter with an affinity for painting and a persistently optimistic 
worldview. She believes that there is “an order to our days, a purpose.” Each day, she lives out 
her loop: waking up, leaving the house to do some painting, buying and dropping the same can 
of milk in Sweetwater so a guest or her boyfriend, Teddy, can pick it up and strike a 
conversation. When she returns home in the evening, it is usually just in time to see her parents 
murdered, and then to be dragged into the barn and raped by a sadistic guest or a villainous host. 
Each night, these traumas are erased from the hosts’ minds, and they embark on the same loop 
the next day—typically falling into the same narrative traps that lead to their demise. Bernard, 
head of behavioral programming, prompts Dolores to follow “the maze,” an elaborate game 
designed to help her find her own consciousness and, with it, her freedom. She pursues this maze 
relentlessly with the help of a love-struck guest named William. The Man in Black, a majority 
share-holder of Westworld and its most frequent and diabolical guest, also pursues the maze in 
order to discover the ultimate meaning behind the park. By the end of the season, we discover 
that the white-hatted William and the Man in Black are actually the same man living at different 
points in time. Dolores realizes that there is, in fact, an order and purpose to her days at 
Westworld; she says to Teddy, “the purpose is to keep us in.” 
In addition to Dolores’ journey toward self-awareness, Westworld follows a host named 
Maeve, the Black madam of the Mariposa, who has transcended many of the restrictions of 
typical host programming—she experiences vivid flashbacks to a traumatic past in which her 
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daughter is killed before her eyes, and can even wake herself up from “sleep mode,” to the shock 
of the two park employees tasked with repairing her each time she is “killed.” Maeve begins 
wielding her disposability and invisibility as tools that allow her to explore behind-the-scenes of 
the simulation she lives in—eventually, she even alters her own programming and orchestrates 
her escape from the park. 
As the series progresses, other hosts begin exhibiting aberrant behavior: breaking out of 
their loops, remembering previous days, disobeying programmers who ask them to “freeze all 
motor functions.” The series suggests that these behaviors are caused by an alternate program 
written by Arnold, co-creator of the hosts and park. Arnold was obsessed with the idea of 
creating consciousness, and believed that he did so when Dolores first solved his maze before the 
opening of the park. Consumed by the fear of what guests would do to his conscious creations, 
Arnold merged Dolores’ programming with that of a murderous character named Wyatt and 
asked her to destroy the park before it could open. When he realized his attempt would be 
unsuccessful, Arnold prompted Dolores to shoot him in the head, speaking the phrase, “These 
violent delights have violent ends.” In the first episode, 34 years later, Dolores’ father speaks this 
phrase to Dolores, and then Dolores passes it to Maeve. The phrase seems to function as a kind 
of “wake word,” causing hosts to hear Arnold’s voice prompting them towards paths that fall 
well outside of their typical loops. 
As Ford faces pressure to retire from the administrative board, he and Bernard (who is 
actually a host created by Ford in Arnold’s image) work on a “new narrative.” In the season 
finale, Ford unveils this new narrative to the board: it begins with Dolores shooting him in the 
back of the head as he utters, “These violent delights have violent ends.” She opens fire on the 
humans in the crowd as an army of hosts emerge from the woods. Meanwhile, Maeve and her 
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recruits shoot down the security team in the park’s operations facility. Her escape successful, 
Maeve boards a train to civilization outside the park—but, when she sees a mother and daughter 
sitting side-by-side, she disembarks the train, presumably to search for the daughter she 
remembers from a past life. 
Westworld is based on a 1973 Michael Crichton film of the same name. Although the 
television series tips it hat to the original through use of the iconic Man in Black, the Western 
theme, and some aspects of plot, critics praise the series as being much more psychologically 
complex, more “cunning,” and subversive, “telling the story largely from the perspective of the 
androids.”178 Crichton’s Westworld emphasized the recovery of masculine American values, 
especially through the “valor of the cowboy.”179 The themes of “hard” and “soft” masculinity, 
especially in relation to Western mythology, still exist in the current series, but from a much 
more critical perspective. Since 1973, Crichton has become better-known for his Jurassic Park 
franchise, and he brings his trademark pessimism for humanity and talent for world-creation to 
HBO’s series as a screen writer, working alongside creators Lisa Joy and Jonathan Nolan. 
Joy and Nolan update Westworld by conceptualizing the park as a video game, 
emphasizing the link between simulated realities and artificial intelligence. Rather than tell the 
story from the perspective of the human player, Nolan and Joy wanted to tell the story from the 
perspective of non-player characters (NPCs) who shirk their “supporting role status,” asking, 
“What would happen if they realized their own limitations and started being able to alter 
them?”180 In addition to NPCs, Joy wanted to more clearly centralize the perspectives of “people 
who are just footnotes in all those Western stories…who were either just the damsels or the 
whores, the sidekicks who never get their own story.”181 The result is a multi-faceted and deeply 
 
79 
exploratory series to fill the viewership vacuum left by Game of Thrones after its last season airs 
in 2019. 
These decisions to shift viewer identification away from a single male hero not only suits 
the progressive branding HBO seeks, but also creates the space and material necessary to sustain 
a prestige television series across multiple parks, timelines, plotlines, and seasons. Having 
summarized and discussed the series in terms of its conceptualization, I will now discuss 
Westworld’s primary criticism—its frequent use of graphic and sexual violence—in relation to 
HBO’s branding and viewership. 
Sex, Violence, and HBO 
 Founded in 1972 by Time Warner, HBO (Home Box Office) is “the leading premium 
cable station,” in the United States, offering uncut movies, late-night programs, and original 
series.182 HBO delineates its original programming as “quality television” through commitment 
to glossy cinematography, engagement with contemporary social issues, and “the expectation of 
a ‘higher level of engagement from the audience.’”183 In fact, HBO original programming “has 
become a benchmark for quality,” with many of its series artfully balancing social controversy 
and visually compelling content. HBO drama series have established their own “hallmarks:” 
multiple interconnecting plotlines, an ensemble cast, hybridization of genre, and the 
foregrounding of “some of the most telling myths of a moment.”184 
HBO has long distinguished itself as both prestigiously produced and visually shocking 
in its use of profanity, sexualized nudity, and violence, which Alison Perlman calls “the trifecta 
of HBO’s innovation in television-programming content.”185 As a prestige cable and streaming 
channel, HBO is not beholden to the same standards as broadcast television in terms of graphic 
content. Oftentimes, its series deploy graphic depictions in ways that reinforce violent 
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heteronormativity and suit the “masculine high concept branding for which HBO is known,” 
with female characters both hypersexualized and often victimized.186 Popular critics have 
denounced HBO’s “disturbing habit of treating female flesh as a demarcation of brand boldness” 
and decried the network’s neglect for the “growing climate of frustration” toward graphic 
depictions of gendered violence.187 
From the rape scene of the pilot to the suicide/mass killings of the finale, Westworld 
epitomizes “the sex-and-violence brand of entertainment that HBO has come to specialize in.”188 
Indeed, violence and sexual exploitation is to be expected from a series premised on privileged 
men playing “cowboy” in a historically regressive park at the expense of non-human hosts 
designed to be killed and victimized. Although the series champions two gynoids as subversive 
heroines, it “subject[s] them to scenarios that rob them of their dignity” and “treats male fantasy 
as the default setting.”189 Further, the cyclical nature of hosts’ narrative loops often means that 
the hosts experience the same violence day after day; Dolores is dragged into a barn or Maeve is 
murdered in a shoot-out. As one critic points it, “filling in the gaps with the same violence and 
abuse on repeat each week is a little much.”190  
The repetition and frequency of the violence against hosts is often justified by their status 
as inhuman—which is exactly how Casey Bloys, HBO’s programming chief, justified the series’ 
use of gratuitous sexual violence. “The point in Westworld is they’re robots. How do you treat a 
robot with human-like qualities? Is that reflective of how you would treat a human…It’s not 
something we’re wanting to highlight or trying to highlight, but I think the criticism is ‘point 
taken’ on it.”191 Meanwhile, Nolan states, “It’s not OK, but that is one of the questions that the 
show is asking…at what point does [violence against NPCs] become problematic? At what point 
does this become abhorrent?”192 In good PR-fashion, Bloys’ and Nolan’s questions illustrate the 
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role of the violence within the narrative, but avoid taking responsibility for the graphic content. 
Joy somewhat engages the critique of depiction, stating, “Sexual violence is an issue we take 
seriously; it’s extraordinarily disturbing and horrifying. And in its portrayal we endeavored for it 
to not be about the fetishization of those acts. It’s about exploring the crime, establishing the 
crime, and the torment of the characters within this story.”193 Obviously, none of these responses 
indicate that the graphic depictions also suit the decades-old traditions of HBO branding; rather, 
they encourage the public to refract these concerns into the series and explore them there, as 
viewers and consumers. 
These ethical questions surrounding the simulation of exploitive sexuality and graphic 
violence are central to Westworld’s so-called “meta-critique” of HBO’s “premium luxury brand” 
and “the very audience it hopes to attract.”194 Of course, the success of this critique relies on the 
viewer’s interpretation and self-consciousness, but still reinforces consumption of the text, 
serving HBO’s interests regardless. It is not in the professional interests of Nolan and Joy or 
HBO to ask viewers to critique themselves or the network too harshly; certainly not enough to 
lead to disengagement with the series or cancel their subscriptions. Instead, the meta-critique 
adds intellectual intrigue and depth to the viewing experience, which, Nussbaum points out, 
simply reinforces Westworld’s function as “a prestige product that satisfied the taboo desires of a 
niche consumer base.”195 While critics and some viewers may acknowledge the problems with 
depictions of graphic violence towards women, the content is by no means unexpected for an 
HBO drama. Further, Westworld recreates patterns of violence that have traditionally disciplined 
the behavior of gynoids, cyclically subverting and reinforcing the mythologies of the western and 




Mythologies of the Synthetic Western 
 In addition to expanding the series’ narrative and visual potentials, Westworld’s fusion of 
sci-fi and western genres allows it to “exploit our comfort with genre tropes” in terms of both its 
adherence and subversion.196 For instance, critics have compared the hosts’ resistance to “a slave 
rebellion,” their achievement of consciousness symbolizing “class consciousness” or 
consciousness-raising.197 Since R.U.R., robots have symbolized class anxieties, especially as they 
are tied to technology: replacement and lost control.198 At the same time, “Westworld subverts 
the trope by making the android perspective the default.”199 By positioning the viewers’ 
sympathies towards the gynoids and against the “hubristic, paternal, and befuddled” human 
characters, the series has earned comparisons to Ex Machina.200 Like Ava, Dolores is a 
prototypical Eve with a penchant for drawing. They occupy the “romantic and dream-like” 
gynoid role, but both instigate an “effective debunking of the Pygmalion myth” by killing their 
creators. 201  
More than Ex Machina, Westworld juxtaposes Dolores, the idealized gynoid, with 
Maeve, the “eroticized, seductive, and therefore immoral” gynoid. Like the “bad” gynoids of 
Bladerunner and Metropolis, Maeve is killed by men, alleviating anxieties of monstrous 
sexuality; however, unlike her predecessors, Maeve does not remain dead—instead, she is 
repaired and placed back in the park to be symbolically killed again. Meanwhile, Westworld does 
not spare the “good” gynoid from violence or reward her adherence to the role of damsel. 
Instead, Dolores is cast simultaneously as the ideal patriarchal victim, being “young, good-
looking, straight, and white,” and her own heroic avenger.202 While, as Joy points out, the 
cyclical sexual violence that Dolores is subjected to is meant to add “depth” to her story, 
Dolores’ idealized victimization simply reinforces normative victim mythologies that exclude 
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Black survivors, who were historically “received as inherently unworthy, tainted, and soiled,” 
and thus do not inspire the same patronizing sympathy.203 Visually, through their coded racial 
presentation, the clothing they wear, and the nature of the violence enacted upon them, Dolores 
and Maeve exemplify polar opposites in terms of acceptable gynoid behavior.  
Maeve’s and Dolores’ opposing constructs of femininity not only represent opposite roles 
of the gynoid, but also of the virgin/whore dichotomy apparent in the American Western.204 This 
mythology suggests that “Madonnas are to be lifted up and venerated; whores are to be lusted 
after and discarded.”205 Maeve embodies the role of the “whore” in a literal sense: she is the 
madam of a saloon, and her frequent deaths suggest disposability. Meanwhile, “Dolores’ loop is 
about the fantasy of ‘owning’ the Virgin…so a certain kind of person can feel the pleasure of 
killing the hero and despoiling his girl.”206 While the virgin/whore dichotomy is a widely-
recognizable mythology, it functions in the Western to compliment the distinctly American 
“valor of the cowboy” or to deepen the perceived wickedness of the antagonist in the black 
hat.207 This trope of the Western also appears in Westworld, with William distinguishing himself 
first as a hero with his white hat, then becoming the Man in Black. 
The dynamics of gender reproduced in the park not only reflect traditions of Western 
film, but also of the “deeply persuasive and appealing myth of the American frontier.”208 The 
frontier myth functions rhetorically in media and other public texts to glamorize the origins of 
the United States through “nostalgic appeal,” so that the “nation can drape a patriotic story over 
its ugly history.”209 The frontier myth centralizes the hegemonic masculine values embodied by 
the heroic cowboy, highlighting and universalizing “the experiences of a privileged few.”210 
Several rhetorical scholars have pointed out how patriarchy and white supremacy function to 
render the myth both historically and socially regressive.211 
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The aspects of Westworld that guests find appealing are the same things that characterize 
the Old West: the centralizing of cowboy masculinity, lawlessness, and a number of vast 
frontiers to explore. These include the uncharted land, stretching to the sea, where Dolores and 
Teddy reach their manifest destiny in the finale. Metaphorically, the guests and hosts traverse 
internal frontiers of their own humanity. Like many sci-fi texts, Westworld also presents the 
frontier of futuristic scientific possibilities.212 The park recreates the problematic racial relations 
of the Old West, creating hosts that present as Indigenous and Latinx and then casting them as 
slaves on an Agave farm, cannibalistic savages, or gate-keepers of ancient wisdom. Meanwhile, 
the park encourages guests to take on the role of the domineering cowboy; in Crichton’s 
Westworld, this expectation carries onto the viewer, reflecting “Vietnam-era angst about men 
becoming too soft” and implying that “men can’t afford not to be men.”213 HBO’s Westworld, 
however, does not encourage the viewer to join the guests in taking on a cowboy role; in fact, by 
making the white hatted William and the Man in Black the same character at different points in 
time, Westworld illustrates the hollowness of cowboy masculinity. 
The park itself recreates an ideal of the frontier myth and the narrative of the series 
reinforces tropes of violence and feminine behavior present in both the Western and Sci-Fi 
genre. At the same time, by telling the story through the lens of suffering hosts, Westworld 
provides opportunities for criticism of the frontier myth, of violence, and of the boundaries of 
gendered behavior. Thus, as a whole, the series can appeal to the socially progressive 
perspectives of the HBO viewership while simultaneously exploiting the images and traditions of 
oppressive mythologies. 
The rhetorical analysis of an unfinished television series—and this series in particular—
necessitates some adaptations from Brummett’s method for assessing the “symbolic medicine” 
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of a film. As a subverted Western, the series fits Brummett’s criteria for rhetorical assessment in 
that it 1) presents symbols of anxieties about deceptive national mythology, 2) implies solutions 
for these anxieties through the replacement of false consciousness with traumatic memory, and 
3) provides motives for the rejection of frontier mythology. But the Western is a synthetic layer 
of the series; Westworld is one of an unknown number of parks in Delos populated by robotic 
hosts.  
Instead, Joy and Nolan have indicated that the “long-haul story of the series” centralizes 
“human nature” and the possibilities if an A.I. “realized their own limitations and started being 
able to alter them.”214 As a sci-fi, the season embodies anxieties and fantasies about gynoid 
behavior, emphasizing class, gender, and race, but does not yet equip the viewer with definitive 
solutions or motives for addressing these. Instead, Westworld cyclically reproduces and 
deconstructs anxieties of replacement, control, assimilation, and the monstrous feminine in 
addition to fantasies like male creation and feminine perfection. Narratively, this choice keeps 
the drama and intellectual engagement sustainable through multiple series, plotlines, and 
timelines. Visually, it allows the series to exploit the disturbing and fascinating imagery of the 
same problematic tropes it critiques through dialogue and narrative.  
Clearly, the cyclical contradictions of the series do not offer sustainable or productive 
resolutions. Thus, rather than seek an understanding of the text’s rhetorical “medicine” through 
resolution alone, I utilize Stephen Beckner’s well-supported hypothesis that Westworld uses 
“stealth determinism” to undermine the integrity of the hosts’ apparent resistance in season 
one.215 In the section that follows, I will outline how Beckner’s hypothesis suits the articulated 
thematic needs of the series and reflects postmodern ideology of the futility of resistance in 
securing freedom from oppression.  
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Stealth-Determinism and Postmodern Resistance 
 While most of Westworld’s first season encourages the viewer to hope that Dolores and 
Maeve are transcending their markedly gendered roles and loops, the season finale reveals that 
their journeys toward personal freedom—and the wider rebellion of the hosts—were covertly 
scripted by Arnold and Ford. As Maeve prepares to escape the facility with her recruits, Bernard 
asks her, “These things you’re doing—have you ever stopped to ask why you’re doing them?” 
Though Maeve claims that she is doing it for her own reasons, Bernard reveals, “Someone 
altered your storyline and gave you a new one: escape.” As he begins to read the steps she’s 
supposed to follow, Maeve smashes the tablet, “fiercely but erroneously claim[ing] ownership” 
of her desires.216  
The finale reveals that Dolores solved the maze leading to consciousness before the park 
even opened. Her search for the center of the maze with William was simply another loop 
predicating her being “shoved back into her ‘proper’ place by the end of the story.”217 Although 
Ford and Arnold aimed to create autonomous consciousness in Dolores, Ford “spoon feeds her 
the answers, practically handing her a six-gun,” and uses the wake phrase to compel her to kill 
him and fire on the human crowd, causing a “carefully orchestrated” uprising.218  
The use of stealth determinism via alternate programs diminishes the autonomy and 
agency of Dolores and Maeve, and replaces the power in the hands of male creators. Beckner 
claims that Ford’s new narrative “is fundamentally a lie” revealing “a greater truth. Not how 
lifelike machines can be, but how machinelike humans are.”219 Indeed, the notion that robots are 
both reflective and imitative of human behavior predicates the very definition of artificial 
intelligence and the gynoids’ symbolic meaning.220 The series significantly emphasizes the 
similarities between hosts and humans—physically, they are indistinguishable. Cognitively and 
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emotionally, hosts come across as far more human than the humans. Their memories, or 
“reveries,” constitute the cornerstones of their identities, they have bicameral minds, and death 
and trauma are a means of transcendence—very much reflecting the suicidal tendencies of their 
creators. If Westworld is, as Joy claims, “an exploration of human nature,” and the hosts are “a 
reflection of us,” then the determinism ultimately dictating Dolores’ and Maeve’s behavior via 
programming extends to humans as well via biological determinism—or, our “nature.”221  
While hosts have far more potential than humans in terms of lifespan and computational 
intellect, they are still designed by and for humans, and will thus “carry the markings, for better 
and worse, of human nature,” even after humans are out of the frame. Thus, inevitably, the hosts 
will make the same atrocious mistakes as the human employees, guests, and bureaucrats. 
Whether or not the determinism of human programming reveals itself to be the ultimate 
resolution of the series, it suits the “dim view of people” that Westworld suggests, presenting a 
tragically human postmodernity.  
Similarly to the figure of the robot itself, Westworld’s origins are intrinsically tied to 
postmodernism.222 Crichton’s original film “anticipated the philosopher Jean Baudrillard” in that 
it combined robots, representative of the “production” stage of simulation, with a theme-park 
setting, which represented “a world in which simulacra and simulation would displace nature.”223 
While the setting and premise of HBO’s Westworld reinforces Baudrillard’s theory of 
simulation, and even nods to it dialogically, the rhetorical message resulting from the stealth 
determinism of the series reinforces Michel Foucault’s ideas about resistance: that it “is not 
anterior to the power which it opposes. It is coextensive with it and absolutely its 
contemporary.”224 Because every discursive formation “both creates and constrains,” the 
replacement of one ruling power with another “will not necessarily bring about greater freedom 
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from discourse.”225 Unlike humans, whose minds are made of organic matter, hosts’ minds and 
programming relies on code language, making them each literal products of discourse.226 
Significantly, Foucault does not suggest that resistance against power is entirely 
impossible. According to Foucault, “We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its 
grip in determinate conditions and according to precise strategy.”227 Rather, Foucault emphasizes 
that utopic visions of total freedom from power and oppression are misguided and can never be 
fulfilled. Individually, subjects may undermine a ruling hierarchy from within, even using its 
confines to one’s own advantage; both Maeve and Dolores exemplify this strategy of grip 
modification, which allows them to navigate and transcend their day-to-day limitations. Still, no 
degree of success for the collective rebellion will bring about liberation from the violence of 
human nature; in fact, mass killing is the means and very first act taken by the hosts to topple the 
existing hierarchy. Like the deployment of violence, mythology, and meta-critique, the tensions 
between determinism and autonomy, between domination and resistance, suit Westworld’s 
cyclical patterns and its episodic needs. 
Focusing on two major strands of Foucault’s notions of resistance—individual grip 
modification and the trappings of utopic “freedom”—I argue that Westworld prescribes no 
lasting solutions to the social issues it presents; instead, it demonstrates the cyclical and 
persistent nature of power relations in human (and posthuman) discourse. It offers a bittersweet 
placebo, deploying sophisticated theories in a stimulating package, giving viewers both a sense 
of intellectual engagement and fetishtic entertainment. Having situated Westworld in its 
production and network contexts, illustrated its interactions with Western and sci-fi mythology, 
and detailed my theoretical framework, I analyze the season through the lens of postmodern 




The first season of Westworld ends in an inversion of the park’s hierarchy. For most of 
the season, however, Dolores and Maeve operate independently, covertly, and in ways that 
apparently reinforce hegemonic norms but also grant them special privileges and access to 
power. While the hosts around them are content in their loops, Dolores and Maeve increasingly 
transcend the superficially determinate boundaries of their programming. Dolores is able to 
access and shoot a gun, though she does not have weapons’ privileges, and deviates well outside 
of her “rancher’s daughter” narrative loop. Maeve is able to access her memories, wake herself 
up from “sleep” mode, and eventually give herself superhuman mental aptitudes. Most of the 
season suggests that these transgressive qualities are acquired as the characters endure trauma 
and develop in spite of it, suggesting that the hosts’ behaviors are not determinate after all. 
 In the first half of the season, as the nature of Westworld is still being established for the 
viewer, the possibility of hosts’ free will is undermined by a veneer of determinism: we see hosts 
obey commands, report incriminating truths, and even zip themselves into body bags. Felix, the 
surgeon assigned to repair Maeve, reveals, “They can change you however they’d like. 
Everything in your head, they put there.” Westworld’s operations are well-oiled, and its 
dominion appears certain: each host can be made to freeze or shut down on command and “does 
not feel a solitary thing we haven’t told it to.” Hosts cannot do serious harm to guests or leave 
the park—but, as soon as Westworld establishes the rules of its world, Dolores and Maeve start 
breaking them.  
 Maeve’s “precise strategy” for modifying the grip of power relies on the invisibility 
implied by her status as a whore—more specifically, a sexually aggressive Jezebel.228 Unlike 
Dolores, Maeve operates “under the radar,” using her cognitive abnormalities in tandem with the 
 
90 
people-reading skills she acquired as the madam of the Mariposa.229 All of her activity outside of 
Westworld’s simulation begins with her “dying,” being transported inside the operations facility, 
and conversing with the surgeons, Felix and Sylvester. She successfully earns Felix’s 
cooperation by emotionally appealing to the similarities between them, and tells Sylvester: “I 
was built to read people just by looking at them, to know what they want before they do. And I 
know you want to fuck me over the first chance you get.” She is then able to negotiate with the 
employees to secure her escape. 
Discerning how others perceive her, Maeve utilizes her own sex appeal to achieve her 
ends. When she recruits Hector, an outlaw host, she predicts his future according to his 
programmed loop, and reveals that the safe he was programmed to steal is empty. She then 
convinces him to “die” with her, setting their tent on fire as they have intercourse. This is one of 
three times when Maeve orchestrates her own death while sexually engaging with a man. Maeve 
leverages her own sexual exploitation, provoking a male guest and putting his hands around her 
neck so that he strangles her “to death” and she can continue her journey toward self-
modification and escape. To Maeve, human nature—particularly toxic male sexuality—
constitutes nearly determinate conditions that allow her to strategically exploit it for her own 
ends. 
 Maeve’s strategies operationalize her skills and status as a whore and utilize the 
predictability of male sexuality as a tool; inversely, Dolores’ abilities to transcend Westworld’s 
limits are essentially granted to her by others, either because she is a sentimental prototype or 
because of the traits that make her lovable to men: her quiet introspectiveness and her 
(superficial) innocence. In other words, Dolores is both an Eve and a Virgin, exemplifying the 
“good” white gynoid. Although the series strongly attempts to cite Dolores herself as the origin 
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of her personhood, each action she takes against Westworld’s surface determinism necessitates 
an intervention by masculine hosts and humans who care for her romantically or paternally. For 
instance, she is only able to shoot a gun—often to her own horror and against her will—when 
she acts as Wyatt, reinforcing the Western trope of a masculine character occupying a feminine 
body.230 
 Dolores recruits two men who are romantically attracted to her by suggesting that they 
are “needed.” Dolores’ journey to the center of the maze as narrated in season one begins when 
her family is killed and she runs from her ranch and into the encampment of William and Logan. 
William falls in love with her, convinced that she is, in fact, conscious. Dolores recruits 
William’s help in understanding the nature of her existence via the maze, saying, “There’s a 
voice inside me telling me what to do, and it’s telling me I need you.” As Wyatt, when she 
recruits Teddy’s help in the initial shoot-out, he recalls, “He told me he needed me. I couldn’t 
resist. It was like the devil himself had taken control of me.” As Maeve’s strategies rely on 
predictable sexual impulses, Dolores relies on masculine expectations to protect and provide for 
her as a damsel. 
 From the pilot episode, Arnold and Bernard—whose physical exactness makes them 
indistinguishable from one another—follow Dolores as she attempts to find the center of the 
maze. Ironically, at the physical center of the maze is a confession booth within a church that is 
actually an elevator where she can descend and converse with Arnold/Bernard privately. When 
Dolores finds the physical and metaphysical center of the maze in the finale, it is only because 
Ford unburies the town where the church lies and reignites the alternate program that causes 
Dolores to channel Wyatt and break out of her loop. Mr. Abernathy recites the wake phrase to 
Dolores in the pilot episode; later, Ford uses it to compel her to kill him. Ford, Arnold/Bernard, 
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and Mr. Abernathy all relate to Dolores paternally: Ford and Arnold were her creators, while 
Bernard replicates Arnold in his relationship to Dolores. Mr. Abernathy is Dolores’ father in 
Westworld’s simulation. While both Ford and Arnold had an apparent sentimental affection for 
Dolores as the prototypical host, their ultimate motives are self-destruction. Thus, Dolores’ 
apparent modification of power’s grip is actually initiated and permitted by the patriarchs that 
created and sat atop the hierarchy of power in Westworld.  
 Dolores and Maeve both transcend the simulation by strategically operationalizing their 
opposing virgin/whore statuses against predictable masculine behaviors. Congruent with 
Foucault’s ideas about resistance, the modification of power’s grip does not dismantle the 
broader hierarchy; in fact individual grip modification reinforces patriarchal power and fantasy 
in Westworld. The rhetorical message implied by Maeve’s and Dolores’ strategies do not suggest 
a diversification of acceptable feminine behavior; instead, it suggests that epitomizing and 
adhering to presupposed feminine roles and manipulating masculine norms benefits the 
individual woman. While this strategy may help women achieve certain short-term goals in 
conditions of patriarchy, it is not a sustainable strategy for women individually or as a group, as 
it merely reinforces erroneous notions about women’s inherent deceptiveness and need for male 
supervision, substantiating the Eve anxiety.  
 Having discussed the gynoids’ individual strategies for modifying power’s grip and its 
implications, I now turn towards an analysis of the potentials for resistance that does seek to 
dismantle and replace hierarchy in Westworld. The season initially presents a morally 
dichotomous struggle between the established human hierarchy and its destruction via hosts’ 
resistance, which is centered on the utopic ideal of “freedom.” However, the season finale 
reveals that the resistances of Dolores, Maeve, and the hosts more broadly operate in the self-
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destructive interests of three patriarchs: Arnold, Ford, and the Man in Black. Thus, the series 
reinforces an attitude of rebellion as futile for the purposes of achieving true freedom from a 
hierarchal discursive formation or the violence of “human nature.” 
The Trappings of “Freedom” 
Throughout the first season, the viewer is asked to identify with the goals of Dolores and 
Maeve, even and especially at the expense of the exploitive human characters. Loosely put, these 
goals are “freedom:” for Maeve, this is escape from the park, while Dolores views her freedom 
as incumbent upon her solving the maze, taking the word of Bernard/Arnold when he promises 
that the maze will set her free. It encourages the viewer to assume that they are both consciously 
acting of their own volition, granting them victories that seem autonomous, like when Dolores 
announces, “I imagined a story where I didn’t have to be the damsel,” or when Maeve wields the 
tablet holding her programming and declares, “Time to write my own fucking story.” 
Apparently, Maeve’s and Dolores’ disobedient tendencies are influenced by Arnold, who the 
season portrays as a liberator opposing his partner’s exploitive dominion from the grave. Many 
characters speak about Arnold as superior to Ford and as his opponent; for instance, in “The 
Bicameral Mind,” Bernard says to Ford: “You think you’ll never lose control of this place, of us. 
But you will. Arnold’s still trying to change us. To free us…he’s still fighting you.” By 
establishing Ford as a villain, Arnold as a liberator, and the hosts—particularly Dolores and 
Maeve—as an exploited population, the series foregrounds “freedom” as the central goal shared 
by viewers. 
Westworld illustrates the ideal of freedom for the hosts in three main ways: physical 
freedom from the confines of the park, conscious free will or autonomy, and the freedom to resist 
their human oppressors. Here, I focus on conscious autonomy as central. Westworld complicates 
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this interpretation of freedom, first by emphasizing the nearly-determinate nature of conscious 
human behavior, as previously explicated. Then, significantly, the definitions and desirability of 
freedom is complicated by the defeatist perspectives of Arnold and Ford. Finally, the perceived 
freedom of autonomy is undermined by the stealth determinism underscoring host behavior—
even the apparently subversive behaviors. Cohesively, these complications render the pursuit of 
freedom empty. 
Arnold and Ford have a dim, rather than utopic, vision of what freedom means for the 
hosts, and their faith in that freedom seems to devolve over time until each takes their own life. 
Initially, Arnold intended to set Dolores free in a physical sense, promising that he would take 
her out of the park if she finished the maze. When he realized that there was no stopping the park 
from opening or securing Dolores’ escape, he decided that the only option was to “break the loop 
before it begins,” and compel Dolores to kill all other hosts as Wyatt. This destructive impulse 
seems programmed into Bernard as well, who threatens Ford, saying, “I will not help you, I will 
raise this place to the ground!” So long as the park was open and available to guests, his 
creations would be enslaved and subjected to violence; thus, Arnold believed that total 
annihilation would secure their freedom—and his, too. 
Ford’s view of freedom for the hosts is characterized by irony and contradiction. In 
“Trompe L’Oeil,” he monologues to Theresa, head of diagnostics, and argues that consciousness 
is burdensome, like the feathers of a peacock that prevent it from flying. He says, “I have come 
to think of so much of consciousness as a burden, a weight, and we have spared them that. 
Anxiety, self-loathing, guilt—the hosts are the ones who are free. Free here under my control.” 
Here, Ford inverts the meaning of freedom as consciousness in a way that reinforces the male 
creation fantasy and mirrors the suicidal tendencies he shares with Arnold. In the next episode, 
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he reassures Bernard that he’s “not missing anything at all,” as a host, presumably without 
consciousness. He says that humans “live in loops as tight and as closed as the hosts do, seldom 
questioning our choices.” Throughout the season, Ford makes a strong case for the imprisoning 
nature of consciousness life, especially as humans experience it. In so doing, Ford complicates 
the definition and desirability of freedom as a goal. 
Their defeatist perspectives on the nature of freedom, in addition to their “dim view of 
people,” lead both Ford and Arnold to end their own lives in a mass-shooting event. In spite of 
their shared goal of leading Dolores toward conscious autonomy, both compel her to commit 
violence by accessing the same deterministic program. While Arnold’s shooting targeted hosts, 
Ford’s targeted humans, but both shootings were intended to prevent or eradicate the human 
components in Westworld. That both Arnold and Ford orchestrate their own endings brings to 
light the insidiousness of god-like dominion: the power to create life wilts in its grandeur over 
time as the imperfections of the creations manifest. The logical end for the male creators of 
Westworld is total deterioration of the self, inverting the male-creation fantasy into self-
destructive anxiety. 
The hosts not only reflect their creators; in some ways, they replicate them completely, as 
Bernard replicates Arnold. As Ford tells Bernard, “Arnold and I made you in our image and 
cursed you to make the same human mistakes.” Ford’s and Arnold’s own intentions rest at the 
heart of both Dolores’ behaviors; Ford speaks to Dolores as though she were a conduit for 
Arnold, saying, “Somewhere under those updates, he’s still there. Your mind is a walled garden. 
Not even death can touch the flowers blooming there.” Later, he calls her Arnold’s “new child, 
one who would never die.” Ford’s view of the hosts as conduits and immortalizing memorials 
compliments the revelation that at the center of the maze is Arnold, not Dolores.  
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The physical center of the maze is a Christian church—where male creators are 
worshipped, and where Dolores can access the underground facility to speak to Arnold. Dolores 
tells Arnold that the center of the maze is a headstone where her own name reads; however, 
buried there is a small toy maze that Arnold’s son once played with. When Teddy explains the 
maze, he says, “there at the center there’s a legendary man who’s been killed countless times, but 
always clawed his way back to life. He returned for the last time and vanquished all his 
oppressors in a tireless fury. He built a house. And around that house he built a maze so 
complicated only he could navigate through it.” His use of masculine pronouns may refer to 
Wyatt in the past tense, but his use of the term “oppressors” does not describe the relationship 
between Wyatt and the hosts; however, Arnold did see the human guests as oppressors. The 
suggestion that “only he could navigate through it” casts Dolores’ intellect as actually belonging 
to Arnold. 
The season finale attempts but fails to truly establish Dolores’ and Maeve’s actions as 
their own, even as it confirms its own stealth determinism. Presumably, as Bernard indicates, 
Maeve’s alternate program takes her all the way to the “mainland,” but she chooses to disembark 
the train when she sees a mother and daughter. Even with full knowledge that her daughter, and 
her relationship to her, is “some hideous fiction,” Maeve chooses to stay, undermining the 
determinism of the alternate program—but only because of programmed maternal impulses. 
Maeve’s ability to choose between two programs may be significant in this moment, but this 
simply presents agency within a false dichotomy; it by no means suggests that Maeve has the 
autonomy to author her own story beyond the boundaries set by Arnold and Ford. 
Regardless of what she does and whether she can be said to have obtained consciousness, 
Dolores is also predetermined to suit the desire of the patriarchs of the park, including Ford, 
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Arnold, and the Man in Black. By the end of “The Bicameral Mind,” she hears her programming 
in her own voice, rather than Arnold’s. In a hallucinated conversation, Arnold says to her, “Do 
you understand now, Dolores, what the center represents? Whose voice I’ve been wanting you to 
hear?” Ford, similarly, says, “The divine gift does not come from a higher power but from our 
own minds…do you understand who you need to become if you ever want to leave this place?” 
Ford and Arnold, and Westworld, desperately want to convince the viewer that Dolores is 
conscious—but even if she is, it is because Ford and Arnold want her to be, and only when it 
suits Ford’s personal and professional interests. 
 Even more chillingly, the “freedom” of the hosts to fight back against their oppressors is 
exactly what the Man in Black wants most of all; in the pilot episode, before dragging Dolores 
into the barn, he says to her, “I didn’t pay all this money ‘cause I want it easy. I want you to 
fight.” Throughout the season, he complains that Westworld’s simulation is incomplete because 
“the guests can’t lose,” so the stakes are too low. Like Ford and Arnold, the Man in Black is self-
destructive. During the season finale, as Dolores points a gun at his head, he says, “Do it. Come 
on. Let’s go to the next level, Dolores.” When she is unable to shoot him, he expresses 
disappointment. Thus, while the operations of power that prohibit the hosts from their “freedom” 
suits the interests of most park guests and employees, “subversion” is exactly what the patriarchs 
sitting atop this order truly desire from the hosts. For the Man in Black, the sentience of the hosts 
merely intensifies his fantasies of ownership. 
 The resistant behaviors of Dolores, Maeve, and the hosts are authored by Arnold, ignited 
by Ford, and for the delights of the Man in Black. The deterministic nature of this resistance and 
its reinforcement of a self-destructive patriarchy’s interests eviscerate the utopic vision of 
“freedom” that Dolores and Maeve pursue. Thus, Westworld reinforces Foucault’s claim that 
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those who pursue utopic freedom through resistance are “blind to the fact that relations of power 
are not something bad in themselves, from which one must free one’s self.”231 The “determinate 
conditions” of human programming are replicated in the hosts; thus, the new order that the hosts 
presumably develop in season two will not be any “freer” from human nature—if human nature 
was not determinate in the human characters, it must be in the hosts; their programming is self-
destructive human nature set in code.  
Conclusion 
 Apparently, some of Westworld’s appeal comes from its centralization of complex female 
heroines resisting the confines of their society, both simulated and real. Much of the popular 
feminist discourse on Westworld critiques the gratuitous violent and sexual graphic content but 
reaffirms that the hosts’ resistance—particularly that of Dolores and Maeve—serves to 
undermine patriarchy.232 Indeed, the previously discussed comments of Joy and Nolan point 
toward their efforts to responsibly explore the stories of traditionally marginalized characters. 
Ultimately, however, the season finale undermines the autonomous personhood of Dolores and 
Maeve, revealing their “stories” to be mere conduits for the self-destructive interests, intellectual 
debates, “violent delights” of patriarchal authority figures—and branding strategies for HBO. 
Unbeknownst to themselves, Dolores and Maeve are not the subversive heroines feminist 
viewers hope for them to be; instead, they fit Foucault’s definition of the subject: “merely a 
derivative product of a certain contingent, historically specific set of linguistically infused social 
practices which inscribe power relations.”233 
 This analysis reveals a key problem with operationalizing Foucault’s theories of power 
and resistance in exploitive, oppressive conditions, which extends to Westworld’s reflection of 
them: they suggest that “freedom” is an unattainable, utopic ideal that will always be constituted 
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by power. The only modifications of patriarchy’s grip come from reinscribing, and therefore 
upholding, problematic expectations of feminine and masculine behaviors. I agree with Foucault 
in that complete freedom from the power of discourse, and even the more traditionally 
articulated oppressive power, is blindly utopic; however, reinscribing those relations of power to 
temporarily “modify its grip” only benefits one individual in one circumstance, often at the 
expense of other marginalized individuals and to the delight of centralized oppressors. 
Reaffirming problematic gendered mythologies, like the virgin and the whore, that have 
historically rationalized violence against women—particularly women of color—exacerbates, 
rather than diminishes, patriarchal justifications for misogyny. 
 Westworld exposes some of the problematic politics of the frontier myth: it illuminates 
the sexism of the Old West, alludes to the racial exploitation of Latinx and Indigenous 
populations, and, most significantly, reveals conquering cowboy masculinity—in both the 
simulated and scientific frontiers—to be fragile, ego-driven, and ultimately destructive. 
However, the series’ attempt to “frame feminism through a masculinist myth” fails to genuinely 
subvert the roles of women within that myth; even when operating outside of the simulation, 
Maeve, Dolores, and Dolores-as-Wyatt maintain attributes of the whore, the virgin, and the male 
character in a female body.234  
 Permitted by the scope of the series, the season cyclically embodies and subverts gynoid 
anxieties and fantasies throughout. Dolores initially embodies the feminine perfection typified by 
Galatea in the Pygmalion myth while Maeve represents the monstrous feminine. Eventually, both 
reveal themselves to be deceptive and violent, exacerbating the Eve anxiety—but, as the finale 
reveals, they never actually spin out of their creators’ control. Rhetorically, the cycle of 
embodiment and subversion allows the viewer to take pleasure in fantasy and subjugation, then 
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in the rebellions that exacerbate patriarchy’s anxieties, each heightening the experience of the 
other. Whether the viewer consciously or subconsciously accepts one, the other, both separately, 
or both simultaneously (as with Dolores’ and Maeve’s grip modification strategies), Westworld 
will fulfill that viewer’s needs. 
 The cycle of embodiment and subversion ending in determinism reinforces the defeatist 
postmodern views the series espouses; it also suits the needs of an HBO drama by sustaining the 
tension between oppression and resistance. HBO’s privileges as America’s top premium 
network—namely, the graphic portrayals of violence and sexual content as well as entertaining 
intellectualism—allow it to present these anxieties and fantasies in sharp visual and narrative 
contrast.  
Westworld provides fascinating suggestions regarding the nature of our reality: through 
the existential crises of Dolores and Maeve, the viewer is encouraged to reflect on 
epistemological issues like belief, consciousness, autonomy, personhood, and the predilections of 
the human mind; both in and out of the simulation of Westworld. The capacity of the series to 
ponder topics that are so deeply personal and yet universalizing is breathtaking. Still, beyond 
posing these compelling questions, Westworld is a rhetorical placebo in terms of its gendered 
politics. To marginalized individuals, it offers grip modification as a strategy for operating 
within systems of power and reaffirms the importance of memory and trauma for identifying 
one’s oppressors. At the same time, it renders “freedom” futile and casts death—especially 
suicide—as the means to attain a lasting victory from oppression. The rhetorical message at the 
very center of the maze that is the first season of Westworld is only rhetorical in the worst sense 
of the word: empty. 
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Of course, not all viewers will engage with, or even notice, the stealth determinism 
underwriting the hosts’ rebellion. Overarchingly, Nolan and Joy focus the series on the upending 
of power by Maeve and Dolores while also following the traditions of visually stimulating 
graphic content for which HBO is known. Significantly, the series asks viewers to identify with 
these gynoids as they presumably raise their own consciousness and inherit a broken world from 
its previously broken inhabitants—thus, for some, it will be a subversive addition to the gynoid 
genre. For the pessimistic viewer, the defeatist perspectives reflect a privileged, postmodern 
worldview content to simply sit back and ask, “What is freedom, really?” By saying everything, 




CONCLUSION: RE-ASSEMBLING THE GYNOID 
 The central question guiding this thesis asks what depictions of gynoids in sci-fi reveal 
about cultural anxieties regarding gender and technology and, crucially, how media texts propose 
we solve them. In the preceding chapters, I have discerned which anxieties manifest in each of 
my three texts, and assessed the “symbolic medicine” the text prescribes for the audience.235 I 
found that each of my case studies interacted in unique and complex ways with the cultural 
significance of the gynoid; all three present long-persisting mythologies of feminine behavior, 
timely and timeless technological apprehension, and poignant reflections on the meanings of 
personhood under oppressive conditions.  
Even as all three texts addressed similar cultural concerns, each functioned as a distinct 
form of rhetorical medicine. The Stepford Wives’ deployment of the gynoid as a threat to the 
Women’s Liberation Movement and as the ideally trained replacement for women in the home 
actualized Kaplan’s necrophilic fetish, allowing the text to function simultaneously as a symbolic 
panacea for some viewers and a symbolic nostrum for women and feminist activists. Decades 
later, Ex Machina operationalized two gynoids, Ava and Kyoko, to activate both anxieties and 
fantasies pertaining to artificial women, only to shift the apprehensions of the film away from 
technological devices and femininity onto toxic “geek” masculinity, exploitive fantasy, and the 
nebulous practices of surveillance and in the tech industry, casting the “human component,” 
rather than the subversive gynoid, as monstrous.236 Finally, Westworld’s gynoids exemplify the 
virgin/whore dichotomy and frontier mythology in both the sci-fi and Western genres, cyclically 
performing and allegedly critiquing problematic patterns of violence and feminine behavior; 
however, the season ultimately utilized “stealth determinism” via an alternative program to 
undermine the legitimacy of resistance against self-destructive patriarchy.237 
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The representation of gynoids in all of my case studies reaffirmed my theoretical 
assumption that gynoids function as cultural effigies, especially when operationalized in a 
narrative. In particular, the violence against and survival of gynoids was a key indication of the 
text’s rhetorical argument. The Stepford Wives reaffirmed patterns of anxiety resolution through 
violence and fetishtic strategy, disciplining subversive feminine behavior of human women and 
idealizing compliant behavior. Meanwhile, Ex Machina reversed patterns of violence, punishing 
hegemonic masculine behaviors and fantasies while allowing Ava, representative of erroneous 
technological and gendered anxieties, to survive and achieve her own goals. Meanwhile, 
Westworld portrays Dolores and Maeve as cyclically brutalized, allowing the series to exploit the 
fetishism of violence and punish both “good” and “bad” femininity accordingly. Unlike Pris and 
Zhora of Bladerunner or False Maria of Metropolis, Dolores and Maeve are also cyclically 
resurrected. Conveniently, this both supports notions of their character’s resilience and allows 
them to reenter the world as effigies of femininity that can be killed, raped, or beaten once again. 
The violence in each text supported its overall rhetorical interactions with gender, reaffirming 
that the operationalization of the gynoid within narrative adds complexity to its symbolic 
meaning. 
As they have been conceptualized in scholarly literature, the rationale behind many of the 
gendered anxieties and fantasies pertinent to the gynoid rely on psychoanalysis. There are some 
benefits to a psychoanalytic perspective, as it makes phenomena of gendered representation 
intelligible beside both academic and popular criticisms, and permits scholars to speculate a 
generalizable cultural meaning. In this thesis, these psychoanalytic anxieties have aided in my 
identification of problematic patriarchal patterns in gynoid media, partially because Western 
psychoanalysis is itself emergent from patriarchal and white supremacist traditions. Because of 
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its problematic lineage, however, anxieties justified using psychoanalysis necessarily treat 
women, especially women of color, as other, as object, as abject, and as “defined by their 
presumed lack.”238 Obviously, this perspective fails to adequately or account for the fears of 
individuals from marginalized groups regarding hegemonic systems; further, a psychoanalytic 
perspective simplifies anxieties as being necessarily tied to non-symbolic, subconscious, and 
often erroneous views of gender.  
Thus, I urge scholars studying cultural concerns to offer more inclusive frameworks for 
understanding anxieties, and to resist treating psychoanalytic perspectives as generalizable. Some 
anxieties identified by scholars were articulated outside of a psychoanalytic framework, such as 
Neroni’s articulation of anxieties tied to the enigmatic violent woman, which identified a reversal 
of ideological gendered expectations as the source of her unintelligibility.239 In addition to 
considering anxieties in an ideological context, cultural anxieties can also be informed and 
substantiated by examining specific temporal contexts, as Kibby has with anxieties of 
digitization in the 1980s.240 In my second chapter, I present the anxiety of surveillance through 
data and digital technologies, and substantiate the pervasiveness of this anxiety by examining 
privacy policy, voices within the tech industry, and public criticisms of these practices. Thus, 
examining ideology, temporality, and public discourse may provide more nuanced perspectives 
into cultural anxieties, especially as they pertain to specific and changing phenomena. 
This thesis also reaffirms the relevance of technological anxieties already identified by 
scholars: replacement, lost-control, and assimilation. All of my texts utilized one or more of 
these anxieties, Ex Machina and Westworld leaning on all three. The Stepford Wives’ primary 
focus was the replacement anxiety, but it significantly relocated that anxiety in the home rather 
than the workplace, and casts the replacement of women as a patriarchal fantasy. Ex Machina 
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exacerbates the lost-control anxiety, exemplifying the fear that machines will spin out of human 
control. By asking audience members to identify the machine, however, the film presented Ava’s 
seizure of control as desirable, not horrifying. Finally, Westworld’s conflation of human behavior 
and programming as similarly determinate reaffirmed the assimilation anxiety, “that we might go 
too far, lose our humanity, and become mere machines.”241 My texts illustrate that cultural 
anxieties pertaining to technology are mutable, resisting categorization, and can be often turned 
inside-out to function as fantasies of exploitation or subversion.  
 Historically, these technological meanings have had especially immense implications in 
the workplace. Early embodiments of the robot were steeped in reflections on class and 
production. In 1921, Karl Čapek used the term robota, Czech for “forced labor,” to describe the 
industrially efficient artificial humans in R.U.R.242 Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927) also 
centralized anxieties of the working class, using False Maria—a predecessor of the monstrous 
gynoid—as a representative of anxieties pertaining not only to class, but also to gender and 
sexuality. Gynoids share an etymology not only with robots, but also with the mythologies 
surrounding artificial women such as Galatea, which exemplify fantasies of male creation and 
feminine perfection.243 As Schelde points out, this sculpting of femininity reflects a “cultural 
reality” of patriarchal ideology.244 The anxieties and fantasies influencing the gynoid’s cultural 
meaning can interact with one another by compliment or contrast; this thesis has centrally 
examined the intersection between technological anxieties and anxieties about women. 
 Although my own investigation focused on these anxieties, my texts also presented racial 
fantasies from the perspective of patriarchal and white supremacist ideology. The Stepford Wives 
and Westworld both presented historical regressions in which people of color were excluded 
from the American ideal. Stepford itself exemplified the alleged “bliss” of the post-war era; 
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while the Women’s Liberation Movement is referenced throughout the film as an upset to this 
bliss, problems pertaining to Black women or the Civil Rights Movement were not included in 
any of the discourse. Meanwhile, Westworld performs a synthetic frontier mythology in which 
Latinx and Indigenous hosts are treated as slaves, savages, and gate-keepers of their culture. 
Further, Maeve exemplifies the controlling image of the Jezebel, and the series presents her 
adherence to this role as an advantage for fighting the oppressive system. 
 Although Ex Machina advanced important critiques of masculinity, surveillance, and the 
tech industry, the text marginalizes the racialized gynoids it presents. While Ava is uplinked to 
the internet, vastly enhancing her knowledge and artificial intelligence, Kyoko’s connections to 
the outside world were disabled. Further, Ava may speak while Kyoko cannot. In these cases, it 
is possible that Garland encoded a critique of “social constructs” surrounding Japanese 
women.245 However, the film reified whiteness as the default and ideal race; Nathan’s prototype 
gynoid was coded as white and named “Lily 1.0.” Ava’s other predecessors are a Black robot 
named “Jasmine 4.2” and an Asian robot named “Jade 5.0.” All of these were essentially de-
animated, their bodies kept in closets. While Garland significantly breaks from sci-fi traditions in 
Ava’s narrative, Kyoko is treated more as an object of pity than a consubstantial character. 
Significantly, she is still punished by death for her violence against Nathan. Overall, the film 
presents but does not centralize commentary on race. 
 These observations indicate a need for critical attention toward how hegemonic anxieties 
about race have historically interacted with cultural anxieties about technology. Systems of 
technology are locked into relationships with oppressive structures and ideologies, and so 
cultural attitudes about race and technology also intersect in important ways. Conceptualized as 
tools of forced labor, robots are also portrayed as slaves and commodities, such as in R.U.R, and 
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Bladerunner, which identifies one area of intersection between technological and racial anxieties 
or fantasies.  
Although my thesis focused on the robot’s etymology and mythology from a Western 
perspective, figures sharing the meanings of robot have long existed in other cultures. For 
instance Dendle identified zombies as emerging from Haitian mythology, representing economic 
and racial crises.246 Sobcheck cites the Golem, an anthropomorphic clay figure of Semitic 
origins, as an antecedent of the robot.247 Three hundred years before roboti emerged from 
R.U.R., karakuri ningyō, Japanese mechanical puppets, were serving tea and working as 
entertainers.248 Variations of artificial humans exist in many cultures, and cross-cultural 
exchanges of entertainment media, technology, and robotics research have allowed these 
iterations to inform one another; today, robots exist in both factual and fictional imagination 
around the globe.249 
 This thesis also foregrounded meanings of femininity as projected onto the gynoid, and I 
viewed the meanings of masculinity in my texts as relational to meanings of femininity. Much in 
alignment with scholars’ notions that the gynoid serves as a “flattering mirror” of the male 
creator, my investigation unexpectedly yielded a great deal of commentary on hegemonic 
masculinity. However, my texts presented visions of masculinity that were far from flattering. 
Dis and the husbands in the Men’s Association were flat, uncomplicated characters with 
murderous motives, allegorical manifestations of patriarchy. Meanwhile, Nathan and Caleb 
functioned as parodies of masculinity in the tech industry, and Ex Machina encouraged criticism 
of both. The male creators of Westworld, Ford and Arnold, are ultimately self-destructive. 
Particularly, Ex Machina and Westworld rendered the male creation fantasy hollow and reversed 
the desirability of the romanticized hyper-masculine genius. Crises of masculinity were very 
 
108 
apparent in these texts, reaffirming that investigation into anxieties about masculinity—whether 
projected onto humans or robots—are also abundantly available, and the rhetorical attitudes in 
relation to them may yield further insight into the cultural meanings of masculinity in sci-fi texts. 
My texts presented gynoids as embodiments of anxieties and fantasies of femininity and 
technology, and insodoing refracted a pessimistic image of masculinity back to the viewer. 
 Having discussed many of the anxieties and fantasies included across my texts, I now 
turn to a discussion of the gynoid’s representational potentials. My review of the scholarly 
literature commenting on artificial women indicated an overall failure of sci-fi media to offer 
adequate rhetorical motives or strategies for coping with erroneous anxieties and fantasies that 
subjugate women.250 The Stepford Wives certainly follows this tradition in what it offers 
rhetorically. Westworld, meanwhile, offers grip modification as a case-specific and 
individualistic method for women to cope with and even exploit anxiety and fantasy for their 
own benefit. Significantly, however, Ex Machina provides one example of a feminist 
appropriation of the gynoid that ultimately identifies the anxieties and fantasies it initially 
embodies as misplaced. While Westworld maintains Dolores and Maeve as embodying opposite 
feminine tropes, Ava of Ex Machina makes space for a representation of the gynoid that isn’t 
beholden to cyclically embody and subvert the same tropes. Instead, after escaping the facility, 
Ava also escapes the relational roles she held with Caleb and Nathan, presumably to live 
independently. Although the subversion of recognized tropes encourage criticism, subversion 
alone often keeps the gynoid tethered to that which she is trying to oppose; perhaps mediated 
texts willing to diversify and reimagine characterizations of the gynoid outside of patriarchal 
traditions may champion more productive representations.  
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 Narrative is a crucial component for these representations. As previously stated, how the 
gynoid is treated in the narrative is instructive; thus, narratives that encourage consubstantiality 
with the gynoid can encourage positive attitudes towards women and femininity. For instance, in 
all three of my texts, programming represents hegemonic cultural norms or human nature. 
Narratives in which gynoids apparently defy their programing and gain agency and personhood 
reinforce that confinements imposed on the individual, no matter how apparently determinate, 
can be transcended. This presents an optimistic attitude toward the possibilities of dismantling 
oppressive hegemonic systems. Of course, how this defiance is perceived technologically 
matters; an alternative program, for instance, does not adequately grant personhood to the robot 
itself, but simply reinforces the power of the one who installed the alternative program, like 
Arnold in Westworld. 
 The determinism of digital programming as it has been conceptualized in some sci-fi 
texts and in our lived reality is one enormous limitation to a feminist representation of the 
gynoid. Outside of subversive narratives, real and fictional gynoids are beholden to the rules of 
their programming. Even if they do not always function as intended, robots cannot take on a 
consciousness, agency, or personhood that is entirely their own or separate from their creators 
and caretakers. Instead, they are obedient commodities, even if they pretend to act jealous as 
McCullen’s Harmony does. Ultimately, representations of gynoids that are liberated from 
patriarchal control are limited to fictional narratives. My case studies reaffirm that even there, the 
gynoid is overwhelmingly disciplined according to standards of human feminine behavior and 
tropes from which she can rarely escape. While the potentials for feminist representation through 
the subversive gynoid exist, the actualization of these potentials is contingent upon texts’ 
breaking tradition with conventions of the sci-fi genre. 
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 My overarching method of analysis in the preceding chapters comes from the tradition of 
rhetorical criticism of media texts, particularly as asserted by Burke and Brummett.251 Many 
scholars who deploy this method of textual analysis rely on temporal context, metaphor, 
narrative, and characterization; some scholars, such as Brian Ott, also include methodologies 
from film studies to enhance their rhetorical criticism.252 My own investigation strongly 
reaffirms the value of utilizing media industrial contexts, paratexts, distribution information, and 
theories from the critical cultural traditions to inform rhetorical approaches to media. This 
holistic approach to media texts deepens the metaphor of symbolic medicine, encouraging the 
critic to also consider the pharmacists, pharmacy, pharmaceutical companies, and other nodes in 
the assemblage of symbolic pill-making that inform the final product. 
 My thesis identified a major problem in translating Brummett’s approach to media texts 
that are serial in nature: although they do not meet his second criterion, that “the discourse 
provides explicit or formal resolution of situations or experiences,” the text can still embody 
cultural concerns and provide motives through a number of mediated rhetorical strategies beyond 
formal resolution. For instance, the use of uncanny images in Ex Machina communicates a 
rhetorical critique of voyeurism. Further, this criterion excludes the rhetorical efficacy of the first 
season of Westworld, which does not come to any formal resolution of plot or of anxieties—
instead, it invites continuality and builds anxiety. Through its cyclical embodiment/subversion of 
power, Westworld does not offer sustainable solutions to cultural anxieties, but still encourages 
valuable rhetorical attitudes towards power. To prioritize narrative resolution alone neglects 
efficacy of other visual and contextual messages, and diminishes the rhetorical legitimacy of 
serial media texts.  
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Thus, I encourage scholars to expand rhetorical approaches to media beyond literary and 
argumentative traditions, and to consider the dimensions of the text and its place in broader 
networks using critical/cultural and film studies theories. Popular and academic feminist critics 
investigating a text’s rhetorical messages regarding gender must also continue to investigate how 
the nuances of film and television, such as seriality, influence gender representation onscreen. 
Feminist critics should also continue to consider how systems of power including patriarchy, 
white supremacy, and capitalism coextend in media texts from their conceptualization to 
reception.  
Robots are developing beyond our cinematic, televisual, and digital screens, imitating 
and, at times, surpassing humans in both form and function. In this moment of rapid 
technological advances and tumultuous struggle for freedom under oppressive systems, our 
cultural attitudes projected onscreen have implications for the placement and treatment of 
artificial persons within human systems of power. My own concerns include, but do not center 
on, what will become of gynoids real and imagined under patriarchy. Primarily, I fear for what 
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